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Conclusion  46 CONVERSION OF NATIONAL CURRENCIES 
All statistical data published in this Report are provisional for 1975 and often for 
1974 as well. Throughout this Report data for the Community as a whole refer 
to the present nine member countries: statistics for years prior to 1973 have been 
adjusted to add data for the three new Member Countries to those of  the original 
"Six". 
The equivalent in units of account of amounts in national currencies has been 
calculated at exchange parities or central exchange rates as appropriate. For 
currencies which began floating in 1972 exchange parities declared to the Inter-
national Monetary Fund were replaced as from mid-1972, initially by the middle 
closing rate on 29th December 1972. For the currencies which began floating 
in early 1973, exchange parities were replaced initially by the middle closing rate 
on the 19th or 20th of March, as appropriate. The conversion rates for currencies 
with floating exchange rates were subsequently altered whenever the monthly 
average of market rates varied by more than 5% from the conversion rate in use. 
These conversion rates were applied to the available statistical material in the 
following manner: 
- for individual operations and for amounts outstanding at any particular time, 
the conversion rate appropriate to the period was used 
- for annual totals (such as for Gross National Product or Gross Fixed Invest-
ment), a weighted average of conversion rates in force during the year was 
used. 
The conversion rate for the EURCO which consists of the sum of fixed amounts 
of the currencies of all the Member Countries of the European Community was 
taken to be that in force when the first EURCO  issue was made in September 
1973. 
Statistics relating to 1974 and 1975 have been derived from rates of conversion 
between national currencies and the new European Unit of Account based on a 
"basket" of member states' currencies. The composition of this basket is such 
that as at 28th June 1974 the sum of the component currencies would have been 
equal in value to the International Monetary Fund's Special Drawing Right when 
calculated on the same basis as the latter, and hence the same as the Bank's 
statutory unit of account by virtue of the common gold content of the unit of 
account and the S.D.R. For 1974, conversion rates into the new European Unit 
of Account as at 30 December 1974 have been applied. The conversion rates 
applicable to statistics for 1975 have been based on the average of rates in each 
quarter, the latter being taken as at the last working day before the commence-
ment of the quarter. INTRODUCTION 
The first economic recession to affect the European Community as  a whole 
which began to develop in 1974 increased in severity in the first half of  1975. This 
downswing in the business cycle was probably accentuated by the decline in the 
volume of investment which took place in  most Member States in  1974 and 
became general throughout the Community in 1975.1n the prevailing conditions 
of slack demand, however, inflationary pressures began to abate while in most 
countries reduced imports led to an improvement in the balance of payments. 
The  authorities  thus  had  room  to  manoeuvre  in  introducing  or reinforcing 
measures aimed at restimulating economic activity and at checking the serious 
and widespread rise in unemployment. 
The  running-down of stocks by enterprises in  the first half of the year, while 
tending to depress output still further in that period, paved the way for the be-
ginning of a restocking movement in some countries in the second half of the 
year  and  thus  helped  to  strengthen  the  impact of official  counter-cyclical 
measures. This improvement in the investment outlook came too late to affect 
the out-turn in the fixed investment of businesses in 1975, although by the end 
of the year orders for plant and  machinery were beginning  to rise  in  some 
countries. 
The general relaxation of monetary and fiscal policy in the Community paved 
the way for a further reduction in short-term interest rates from the very high 
levels which had prevailed on most markets during a substantial part of 1973 
and 1974.  As  a result of the  re-establishment of a more normal relationship 
between short-term  interest rates  and  long-term  yields  (see  Chart V),  bond 
markets were able once more to attract investors who showed increasing willing-
ness in the last quarter of the year to purchase longer-dated securities. Bond 
markets thus ended 1975 in a healthier state than for nearly two years. Prices 
rose also on all share markets except that of Italy, though the amount of new 
share issues was perhaps less than it might have been because of  the continuing 
uncertainty of the economic outlook. 
The volume of personal saving was exceptionally high in 1975. It would appear 
that individuals tended to save more, partly as a precautionary measure in the 
face of rising unemployment, but partly also as an adjustment to higher price 
levels and rates of income. Financial intermediaries tended to have means for 
lending as  well  as  for investment but demand for credit by enterprises was 
relatively weak, except in some countries during the fourth quarter when stocks 
began to be rebuilt. 
The slowness of enterprises to embark on new fixed investment in 1975 appears 
not to have been occasioned by difficulty in raising new capital. The uncertainty 
of the economic outlook during the greater part of the year was an important 
influence but it also appears that profit margins were adversely affected by low 
capacity utilisation,  by the rapidly rising  cost of labour and  by keener price 
competition as rates of inflation declined. In addition to the discouragement of 2 
% 
lower profitability, the financial structure of enterprises  was impaired by the 
effect of inflation on the replacement cost of fixed assets in comparison with 
which provisions for depreciation, based on the historic cost of existing fixed 
assets, were inadequate. For these reasons the capacity of  enterprises to finance 
the acquisition of new fixed assets from internal resources appears to have 
sufferedfurtherduring197~ 
Chart I - Growth in Gross Community Product, 
1971-1975 
1971 
Growth 
in volume 
(percentage change from previous year) 
1972  1973 
Growth 
in value 
1974  1975 
Implied 
price index 
% CHAPTER 1 
INVESTMENT 
1.1. THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND TO 
INVESTMENT 
The extentto which the Gross National Product 
of the Member States declined in real terms in 
1975 is indicated in Chart I. As explained in the 
Introduction, most of the fall occurred in the 
first half of the year and was followed in the 
second half by beginnings of  a revival of  activity 
in  a number of countries. Gross fixed invest-
ment was already declining, by over 2 ·per cent 
in  volume,  in  1974  and  probably  helped  to 
accentuate the depth of the recession in 1975 
when itfell byafurther4.6percentorso.Coupled 
with a lower rate of inflation than in 1974, this 
performance resulted  in  an  increase of just 
under 6 per cent in current prices compared 
with over 13 per cent the previous year. 
The  preliminary statistics in  Table 1 of gross 
fixed investment suggest that its fall in volume 
varied considerably from one country to an-
other. The sectoral pattern, however, was fairly 
consistent in that most of  the decline was con-
centrated in the business sector accompanied 
by a small fall  in  the total for. housebuilding, 
while  fixed  investment by public authorities 
generally rose under various plans for  stim ulat-
ing economic activity. 
The  deterioration in  investment in  1975 was 
most rapid in three countries, Italy, Belgium and 
France, where there was still some growth in 
volume in 1974. In  two other countries, Den-
mark and Luxembourg, where the volume of 
investment was already declining in 197  4, there 
was a further but limited deterioration in 1975. 
In  the Netherlands, in  the same manner, the 
contraction of  investment continued at  a slight-
ly faster pace while  in  Germany it fell  to a 
smaller extent in 1975. The United Kingdom and 
Ireland also experienced less of  a fall in invest-
ment in 1975. These two countries, however, 
were distinguished from all the others, with the 
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exception of Italy, by their relatively high rates 
of inflation which resulted in their recording the 
largest increases in investment in current price 
terms. 
ln/ta/y, the decline in investmentactivityin1975 
was at  the core of  the recession in the economy, 
as the volume of total fixed capital expenditures, 
after rising by  over  4 per  cent in 197  4, contracted 
by nearly 13 per cent. This movement was most 
marked in the first half of 1975 with some re-
covery occurring late in  the year. The Gross 
National  Product declined  by about 4.5  per 
cent  in  volume  terms,  reflecting  the  worst 
economic recession for over 25 years. Owing 
to the constraints placed on the shedding of 
labour by employers, the numbers of unem-
ployed rose only moderately, despite the se-
verity  of the  recession.  On  the other hand, 
short-time working and partial unemployment 
were considerably higher and  would  in  turn 
have tended to depress demand further. The 
slackening  of  consumer  demand  and  new 
orders, reinforced by the disposal of finished 
product stocks, contributed to a decline in in-
dustrial production of  about  10 per cent in 1975. 
But the slowing in industrial activity was perhaps 
not sufficient by itself to account for the much 
greater decline in business investment: in this 
respect  the  very tight restrictions  on  credit 
introduced by the authorities in 1974 together 
with a sharp reduction in profitability, undoubted-
ly played a role  in  decisions to postpone or 
abandon investment planned for 1975. 
From the beginning of  1975 both the fiscal and 
monetary policies of  the authorities, having pre-
viously  been  aimed  at countering  inflation, 
turned progressively towards stimulating the 
economy.  Following  measures  introduced 
earlier in the year, the government proposed 
an emergency programme in August, amount-
ing to over Lit. 4000 milliard or about4 percent 
of G.N.P.,  of aid  for boosting  investment in 
social housing, public works and the productive 
industries. Since it was not until mid-October 
that this plan was approved, very little of  these 
funds  was  disbursed in  1975.  This  easing of 
economic policies was facilitated by  the attain-4 
Table 1 -Gross fixed investment in the Community(l) (2) 
Percentage change from previous year 
In Value  In Volume 
Countries 
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975 
Germany  23.9  12.2  7.0  5.1  -2.1  -1.3  11.0  4.5  3.0  0.5  -8.1  -4.1 
France  13.1  11.6  12.4  13.3  18.8  6.0  5.8  6.6  7.4  5.9  2.9  -4.5 
United 
Kingdom  9.6  10.9  11.4  19.5  17.1  23.8  2.1  2.0  2.5  2.6  -2.8  -0.5 
Italy  14.2  3.7  5.8  25.3  34.1  4.3  2.7  -3.1  0.4  8.2  4.2  -12.7 
Netherlands  18.3  13.4  4.0  11.5  6.3  6.1  10.1  3.3  -3.5  5.5  -4.2  -3.9 
Belgium  18.6  6.4  8.9  14.6  22.3  9.3  8.4  -1.7  4.4  7.8  5.6  -3.3 
Denmark  10.3  9.3  15.2  19.4  6.5  -1.1  3.0  4.4  7.9  6.1  -10.4  -11.5 
Ireland  8.6  20.3  10:1  29.6  16.6  11.9  0.2  9.4  -0.2  16:4  -5.7  -5.5 
Luxembourg  21.2  23.4  7.9  18.7  5.4  3.2  10.7  12.9  3.2  11.3  -7.2  -5.1 
Total 
Community  16.6  10.5  9.0  13.2  13.1  6.1  6.7  3.3  3.5  3.9  -2.2  -4.6 
(  1) The percentages for 1975 are approximations based on orders of  magnitude. 
(2) For individual countries, percentages are based on amounts in national currencies. For the Community 
total, amounts in  national currencies have been converted into units of account at exchange rates 
prevailing in the relevant year. 
ment of a much reduced rate of price inflation. 
The  year-on-year  increase  in  the  consumer 
price index to December1975was  11.2 percent 
compared with a rise of 24.5 per cent during 
the  previous  twelve  months.  However,  this 
improvement  has  proved  short-lived  since 
wage rates at end-year were increasing at a 
rate about double that of inflation. 
As  did  Italy,  Belgium  experienced  its  worst 
economic recession since the second World 
War. GNP declined in constant price terms by 
close to two per cent in 1975 compared with a 
gain of four per cent in the previous year. Con-
sumer demand tended to be sustained if at a 
low level but, as a substantial part was met by 
running down stocks of finished goods rather 
than from new output, industrial production fell 
by around 10 per cent. This downturn was most 
acutely  felt  in  the  business  sector  of  the 
economy where the ensuing decline in  con-
fidence, coupled with lower capacity utilization 
and profitability, led to a reduction in  invest-
ment in new plant and equipment. Because the 
threat of an increase in inflationary pressures 
still persisted, when the Belgian Government 
felt compelled to adopt counter-cyclical fiscal 
and monetary policies, it  instituted price control 
measures beginning in May 1975.1nitially there 
was a two month freeze which was subsequent-
ly eased to exempt selected items. Controls 
had  a  limited  success  in  checking  inflation 
since the rate of increase in  retail  prices di-
minished on a year-on-year basis from 15.7 per 
cent in  December 1974  to  11.0  per cent in 
December of last year. The effort to limit the 
rise  in  prices  tended  to  squeeze  company 
profitability. Nevertheless the inflation rate was 
relatively high compared with some of  Belgium's 
main trading partners. 
Total fixed capital expenditures by all sectors 
of the economy declined in real terms by 3.3 
per cent in 1975, after having risen by 5.6 per 
cent in 1974. At current prices however, total 
fixed capital expenditures rose by 9.3 per cent 
in 1975, reflecting the comparatively high rate 
of price inflation. 
In 1975 France which had previously withstood 
other  post-War  contractions  in  economic 
activity experienced a  recession  along  with 
its  partners  in  the European  Community.  In order  to check  the serious growth of  u  nemploy-
ment, official policy  which in the preceding year 
had sought to reduce inflation and to halt the 
deterioration in the balance of payments shifted 
towards  a  selective  restimulation  of  the 
economy. The  change of attitude was  made 
easier by falling interest rates abroad, by a de-
clining rate of inflation on the domestic market 
and by an improvement in the external trade 
balance.  This  last feature,  however, resulted 
from a reduction in  imports rather than from 
an  increase in  exports and was in turn partly 
explained by a sharp contraction in domestic 
demand  and  partly by the  running  down  of 
stocks of industrial raw materials, particularly 
of petroleum. The measures aimed at stimulat-
ing  the  economy,  on  the  other hand,  were 
neutralised for a while by an increased volume 
of precautionary saving and it was not until the 
last quarter of  the year that demand and, finally, 
output began  to  recover but not enough  to 
prevent a fall  of 3 per cent in  the volume of 
Gross Domestic Product. 
The  weakness of demand affected business 
confidence to the extent that investment by 
private  enterprises  fell  sharply in  volume  in 
1975 and outweighed an  increase in  invest-
ment by  public  enterprises.  Housing  invest-
ment was also lower in 1975 after rising rapidly 
to mid-1974. Only investment by public author-
ities showed any real advance in 1975.1n total, 
fixed investment fell by 4.5 per cent in volume 
whereas in 1974 it rose by nearly 3 per cent. 
In  Denmark the  impact of the economic re-
cession was less than in  the three foregoing 
countries, being mitigated to a large extent, at 
least in  the personal sector,  by government 
counter-cyclical policies. The decline in volume 
of GOP was limited to a relatively modest 1 per 
cent in 1975, although gross fixed investment 
calculated at constant prices fell a little faster 
than in 1974. The authorities played a very active 
role in introducing measures to stimulate con-
sumer spending and new investment with the 
aim of checking the growth of unemployment. 
At the very beginning of 1975 direct taxes on 
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personal  incomes were reduced, raising dis-
posable income by about D.Kr. 7 milliard, and 
thus contributing to a simultaneous growth of 
consumer expenditures and personal savings. 
In September a major programme was instituted 
which  included  the  reduction  of the  value-
added tax rate, until end-February 1976, from 
15 per cent to 9.25 per cent. This also helped 
to restore the volume of personal spending to 
where it stood before the decline which oc-
curred  in  197  4  but,  to the extent that rising 
demand was met from imports, official policy 
did not entirely succeed. The number of reg-
istered unemployed rose by about 30 per cent 
during the year to December 1975, though the 
worsening trend seemed to be flattening out by 
the fourth quarter. On the other hand the steps 
taken by  the Government in the general climate 
of reduced economic activity had a dampening 
effect on  earnings and  price increases. The 
initiative  of the authorities  in  March 1975  in 
freezing collective wage agreements was part-
ly responsible for the lqwering of the rate of 
expansion in annual earnings to about 15 per 
cent in the year. The simultaneous freezing of 
company profit margins exercised a restraining 
influence on  price rises  while the temporary 
cut ·in  VAT introduced in  September lowered 
the consumer price index by almost 4 per cent. 
As a result, this index rose by only 4.3 per cent 
during 1975compared with 15.5 percent  during 
the previous year. 
The  freezing  of collective wage agreements 
would perhaps have improved prospects for 
investment were it not for the accompanying 
freezing  of  profit  margins.  Thus,  despite  a 
succession of direct or indirect measures of 
encouragement,  total  fixed  capital  expend-
itures declined in volume by about  11.5 per cent 
in  1975, slightly more than the 10.4  per cent 
recorded  in  1974.  Demand  for  investment 
goods  remained  the  weakest  aspect of the 
Danish economy in 1975 and was accentuated 
by a slackening in demand from export markets. 
The volume of export sales of manufactured 
products, taken as a whole, declined by about 
7 percentin1975andwas undoubtedly a major 6 
factor  in  the  build-up  of  surplus  industrial 
capacity and in the rise of unemployment. 
The Luxembourg economy suffered particular-
ly from the extent of the cutbacks in the steel 
industry in 1975 which had an adverse effect 
upon unemployment, business income, invest-
ment and exports, and were largely responsible 
for a serious 7.7 per cent decline in the volume 
of GOP. The steel industry provides almost 60 
per cent of industrial output of  the country and 
so the decline of 31  per cent in its production 
last year was severely felt, though by the end 
of the year an upturn in new orders indicated 
that the lowest point of  the recession had prob-
ably  been  passed.  During  1975  the  public 
authorities  engaged  on  a  two-pronged  pro-
gramme -amounting to some Flux 640 million-
involving  first,  the  promotion  of  selective 
schemes to create employment opportunities 
and  secondly, the compensation of firms for 
retaining workers on a part-time basis.  How-
ever, industries orientated towards the domestic 
market,  such  as  agriculture and  the service 
industries, experienced rather better trading 
conditions which helped to soften the impact 
of the recession. 
With the exception of public authority expend-
iture programmes, gross fixed investment de-
clined again last year. After a fall in volume of 
over 7 per cent in volume in 1974, it declined by 
about 5 per cent in 1975. Taking into account 
the relatively rapid rise in the prices of invest-
ment goods, there was an  increase of 7 per 
cent in capital expenditures at current prices 
compared with the previous year.  Anti-infla-
tionary fiscal and monetary policies in fact met 
with only very limited success, owing in part to 
the openness of  the Luxembourg economy, as 
the consumer price index rose 10.9 per cent 
during the twelve months to December 1975, 
virtually the same as the 11.2 per cent recorded 
in the previous year. 
The  downturn  of  economic  activity  in  the 
Netherlands last year was severe but perhaps 
less pronounced than in many other Community 
countries. At the same time certain underlying 
structural problems in  the economy, notably 
the need for higher profitability in  the enter-
prise  sector to  encourage  new  investment, 
were  coming  into  sharper focus.  In  volume 
GOP  declined by about 1.8 per cent in 1975 
compared with a rise of 3.3 per cent in the pre-
vious year. Much of this fall resulted from con-
tractions in the volume of  new fixed investment 
of 4.2 per cent in 197  4 and 3.9 per cent in 1975, 
although  in  both  years  there was  a  rise  of 
between 6 and 7 per cent at  current prices. The 
run-down of stocks in 1975 combined with a 
5 per cent reduction in the volume of exports 
to bring about a contraction in demand for new 
production, as exemplified by the 7 per cent 
decline in industrial output last year. In certain 
other sectors of  the economy, however, there-
cession had less effect. Consumer spending, in 
which purchases of cars figured prominently 
in the early part of the year, rose in volume by 
3.5 per cent in 1975-somewhat faster than the 
2.5 per cent achieved in the previous year. But 
unemployment rose as  businesses sought to 
cut back on labour costs which were mounting 
rapidly at  a time of reduced output  and produc-
tivity. In addition there was concern as to the 
shortfall in employment opportunities related 
to investment expenditure. 
The fiscal policies of the Netherlands govern-
ment which were introduced in 1974 and re-
inforced  in  1975  were  highly  expansionary, 
being  aimed  at  alleviating  social  problems 
caused by rising unemployment; they consisted 
in  part in  reducing taxation and in part in ad-
ditional expenditure. At the same time price 
controls were maintained in a continuing effort 
to slow the rate of price inflation. As  the re-
cession deepened, the authorities introduced 
further  measures,  specifically  in  November 
1974, in February and April of last year and in 
the  1976  Budget,  to  promote  industrial  re-
location and  to provide aid  for special con-
struction  projects.  A  main  concern  of  the 
authorities  was  the  adverse  influence  on 
employment of the obsolescence of the in-
dustrial structure and ensuing low productivity. 
In mid-year measures were introduced to ease the pressures on corporate profit margins by 
not allowing growth in nominal wage rates to 
compensate for the_ rise in the cost of living in 
the  first half of the year,  and restricting  the 
growth in real wages in  the second half-year 
to zero. Nevertheless during 1975 hourly wage 
rates rose by 12.5 per cent compared with a 
rise  in  the consumer price index of 10.2 per 
cent. This performance of wage rates last year 
no doubt contributed to the smallness of the 
decline in  the rate of price inflation over the 
year. Manufactured exports declined in volume 
by about 6.5  per cent in  1975,  rather more 
sharply  than  the  average  of world  trade,  a 
feature which raised concern about the con-
tinued competitiveness of Dutch products. 
In  common with the rest of the Community, 
Germany suffered during 1975 from a severe 
business  recession,  but  the  economy  dis-
played greater strength than others as the year 
progressed. GNP which was still increasing, if 
marginally, in 197  4, declined last year by  3.2 per 
cent in  terms of volume. The  contraction of 
activity would have been even greater but for 
higher  government  expenditures  resulting 
from  the implementation of counter-cyclical 
fiscal  measures.  These  official  steps  were 
successful to the extent  that from July  onwards 
industrial output began to rise and other signs 
of recovery to appear. Thus, despite the relative-
ly poor out-turn for 1975 taken as a whole, a 
change of direction was achieved. 
The volume of gross fixed investment declined 
in 1975 by 4.1  per cent compared with a con-
traction of 8.1 per cent in the preceding twelve 
months. The fall in investment for two consec-
utive years  no  doubt reflects  the  extent to 
which business confidence was undermined 
by the recession; in turn it contributed to the 
decline  in  activity.  A  further factor was  the 
strength of price competition which developed 
on the domestic market and export markets 
in conditions of reduced demand. The volume 
of exports of goods and services, for example, 
fell  by 8.7  per cent in  1975. While these dif-
ficulties impeded the raising of product prices 
and  so  contributed  towards  overcoming  in-
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flationary tendencies, they often resulted in a 
serious erosion of profit margins and a con-
sequent discouragement of business invest-
ment. A large part of  the fall in volume of  invest-
ment was therefore concentrated in that of the 
business sector and the only growth in 1975 
was  in  the Government sector but even this 
was much lower than in the previous year. 
During the second half of 1975, however, the 
outlook improved in all sectors of the German 
economy.  The  public  authorities  introduced 
new  measures  in  late  August  to  aid  in  the 
economy's recovery, aimed particularly at the 
construction sector. With the strengthening of 
the domestic market and with a faster inflow of 
orders from abroad, the business sector started 
to raise its investment intentions in the latter 
part  of  the  year.  This  improvement  was 
particularly evident in the demand for machinery 
and equipment. 
The United Kingdom and Irish economies dis-
played  a  number  of similar  characteristics 
which tended to distinguish them from those of 
other Member States. The slowing of activity 
developed rather later and, while the ensuing 
trough was perhaps less marked, the rate of 
inflation tended to be appreciably higher than 
in most other Community countries. Fixed in-
vestment in both countries fell less in volume 
in 1975 than in 1974. The decline in the volume 
of GOP  in the United Kingdom was relatively 
small at  1. 7 per cent in 1975, but the rate of  price 
inflation was unprecedentedly high. In Decem-
ber the retail price index was still rising by 25 
per cent year-on-year, although the bulk of the 
increase had occurred earlier in the year and 
inflation was slowing in  the second half. The 
core of  the authorities' anti-inflationary policy-
the  voluntary limitation  of pay  increases  to 
approximately  11 per cent of  average earnings-
took effect only  in  August  but  was  closely 
adhered to thereafter. This policy was framed 
in the light of an assessment that the loss of 
external competitiveness caused by accelerat-
ing inflation had to be corrected if the growth 
of unemployment was to be contained and that 8 
the problem was less likely to be solved by the 
simple stimulation of internal demand. 
As external as well as internal demand in fact 
fell,  industrial production declined sharply in 
the second quarter of the year and for 1975 as 
a whole was 4.9 per cent lower than in the pre-
vious  year.  The  deflationary incomes  policy 
and the disposal of stocks of finished goods 
were further factors in reducing the need for 
new production although some of their impact 
was absorbed by a lower growth in the volume 
of imports. Under such conditions, unemploy-
ment continued on its rising trend and by De-
cember represented 5.0 per cent of the labour 
force compared with 3.1  per cent at the be-
ginning of 1975. Some signs that the trough of 
the  recession  had  been  reached  by  early 
autumn had not been followed by any significant 
upturn by year-end. Businesses were operating 
below capacity throughout the year and did not 
need to invest. Total fixed capital investment 
by all  sectors of the economy thus declined 
by 0.5 per cent at  constant prices in 197 5 follow-
ing  a decline of 2.8 per cent in  the previous 
year. The inability to improve profitability, either 
because of competitive pressures on shrinking 
markets or because of a system of administra-
tive controls on prices and profit margins, does 
not seem  to have been a major influence in 
1975. 
In Ireland a fall in volume of 6 per cent and a 
rise in value terms of 12 per cent in gross fixed 
investment in 1975 covers a wide difference 
between that undertaken by enterprises and 
by public authorities during 1975. The invest-
ment plans of enterprises suffered a serious 
set-back from world recession. A sharp fall in 
domestic  and  foreign  demand  affected 
manufacturing and service industries at a time 
when  non-agricultural  labour  incomes  were 
rising  relatively  fast  under the  terms  of the 
1975  National  Pay  Agreement.  Because  de-
mand was so depressed stocks were run down 
sharply,  leading  to further cut-backs in  pro-
duction and apparently also to a lowering of 
productivity. Agricultural  output and  exports 
were exceptions in an otherwise sombre picture 
in that net output was over 12.5 per cent up in 
volume and exports rose by47 percent  in value 
compared with 1974 but,  even in  this sector, 
demand was  met partly through the running 
down of stocks. The net result was a fall of 1.0 
per cent in GNP in volume terms, although in 
current price terms there was an increase of 
21.6  per cent. A turning point was,  however, 
reached during the year after approximately 
eight months of decline. During the remaining 
months a modest recovery began as industrial 
output  and exports improved. At the same time 
consumer demand had become buoyant and 
the rise of unemployment was halted. 
The combination of falling output and rapidly 
rising  prices  deterred  not only domestically 
owned enterprises from  extending their pro-
ductive  capacity,  but  also  some  foreigners 
from investing in Ireland as the inflow of  private 
capitalwhichwas£144millionin1974dwindled 
to about £ 5 million in 1975. The public author-
ities, on the other hand, were striving to com bat 
the recession by stimulating economic activity 
while at the same time aiming at a reduction 
in the rate of inflation. With these two not easily 
reconcilable aims in view measures were in-
troduced in June in the form of cuts in value-
added tax,  the introduction of subsidies and 
increased capital expenditure. The beginning 
of a recovery of manufacturing output in the 
fourth quarter of 1975 may have been partly 
a  consequence of these  measures.  The  in-
crease in  public capital expenditure in areas 
such as  housing, industry and telephones in 
1975 was  particularly marked, as  a result of 
which  total  fixed  investment  by  the  public 
authorities probably did not fall at all in volume 
in 1975. 
1.2. INVESTMENT IN THE COMMUNITY 
COUNTRIES BY SECTO.R: 
BUSINESS CAPITAL EXPENDITURES, 
HOUSING CONSTRUCTION, AND 
PUBLIC AUTHORITIES INVESTMENT. 
Gross fixed investment in the European Com-
munity rose in terms of current prices during 1975 in all the three sectors shown in Table 2. 
In the business sector, however, the increase 
of 5.7 per cent over1974 was well below that of 
prevailing rates of price increases and implies 
a substantial fall in volume. The reasons for this 
are  not far to seek in  the circumstances of 
world-wide  recession;  low  demand,  surplus 
capacity,  low  profitability,  the  general  un-
certainty of the economic outlook all no doubt 
played a part in influencing business decisions 
to cut back or postpone investment projects. 
In some countries, however, it seems possible 
that towards  the  end  of 1975  a  number of 
businesses  were  beginning  to  take  a  more 
optimistic view as an upturn in economic activ-
ity began. 
Housing construction increased by only 3.4 per 
cent at current prices during 1975 and so prob-
ably fell more sharply in volume than business 
investment. In some countries the overhang of 
new unsold houses which appeared in the re-
cent past seems to have exercised a dampen-
ing influence. As  regards private housebuild-
ing, it seems probable that there was general 
reticence on the part of individuals to embark 
on the purchase or construction of new dwell-
ings while unemployment was rising and the 
economic outlook remained uncertain. 
As might be expected, the selective investment 
programmes initiated or reinforced by public 
authorities throughout the Community with the 
common aim  of restimulating their separate 
economies resulted in a fairly sharp increase in 
their total capital expenditure of almost 12 per 
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cent during 1975. This was less than_ the 16 per 
cent rise recorded during the previous year but, 
if  allowance is made for  the reduction in the rate 
of inflation in the interval, the growth in terms 
of volume during the two years was probably 
similar. 
Changes in investment in the business, housing 
construction and public authorities sectors in 
individual countries appear in Chart II while the 
proportions  that  fixed  investment  in  these 
sectors form of the total is shown in Table 3. 
Both are represented in terms of  current prices 
and in the circumstances of wide differences 
in price increases as between countries and as 
between sectors, Table 3 is  perhaps a more 
reliable  guide  to  relative  performance.  The 
combination of a shrinking proportion of busi-
ness investment with a rise in the share of in-
vestment by public authorities, characteristic 
of the trough of a recession in  whiyh _official 
measures  to  restimulate  activity  had  been 
brought into  play,  stood out clearly in  most 
Member  States.  The  fall  in  the  proportion 
formed by business investment was particular-
ly marked in the smaller countries, Ireland and 
Luxembourg, counterbalanced in the latter by 
an equally sharp rise in the share of  investment 
by the public authorities. In Denmark also the 
public authorities' share increased substantial-
ly.  The same pattern appeared in  less sharp 
relief in France, Italy  and Belgium. In the Nether-
lands, on the other hand, the business sector 
maintained its share while in  Germany it ac-
counted for an increased proportion ofthe  total; 
in  both these countries public authorities' in-
Table 2-Gross fixed investment in the Community: by sector (1) 
In milliard units of account  Percentage of 
at current prices  total 
Sectors 
1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1970  1975 
Business investment  89.9  99.9  107.5  120.1  135.0  142.7  61.1  59.5 
Housing  34.3  38.0  44.7  51.0  56.2  58.1  23.3  24.3 
Investment by public 
authorities  23.0  25.0  26.8  29.9  34.7  38.8  15.6  16.2 
Total Community  147.3  162.8  179.0  200.0  225.9  239.6  100  100 
(1) The statistics for 1975 are estimates of orders of magnitude. 10 
vestment also rose in relation to the total and 
only housing construction contracted.  The main 
exception to the general pattern was the United 
Kingdom  in  which both business investment 
and  housing  construction  increased  propor-
tionately while the share of public authorities 
was reduced. 
In Ireland, the depressed business outlook and 
the squeeze on profit margins resulting from 
reduced output and higher costs largely ex-
plain  the relatively small rise of about 6 per 
cent in the value of gross fixed investment by 
enterprises  in  1975.  In  terms of volume this 
meant a not surprising fall of the order of  11 per 
cent,  there  being  little  incentive to expand 
productive capacity. The building of factories 
and of business premises generally seems to 
have  suffered more in  this contraction than 
the  installation  or replacement of plant and 
machinery. 
Residential  construction which  increased by 
a quarter in value in 1975 showed real growth 
in that the number of new houses rose by over 
2 per cent. This was entirely attributable to the 
housebuilding  activities  of  local  authorities 
which,  having  received  substantial  financial 
support from the Central Government, rose by 
some 45 per cent at current prices. In the un-
certain economic and financial climate, private 
housebuilding performed less well, falling by 
about 7 per cent in volume. 
Apart from their effort in  housing, the public 
authorities  in  Ireland  increased  their capital 
expenditure by 22 per cent at current prices. 
Their fixed (non-housing) investmenttherefore 
probably increased slightly in  volume and in 
two areas at least, that of improving telecom-
munications, and  of providing capital for in-
dustrial promotion, there was significant real 
growth. 
The pattern of investment in Luxembourg dif-
fered slightly from that in Ireland in that it was 
non-housing investments by the public author-
ities  rather than  housing construction which 
offset the fall  in  the share of investment by 
enterprises. 
In  Luxembourg, the latter form of investment 
declined by about 11  per cent in  volume and 
by one per cent in  terms of current prices. 
Profitability  was  reduced  and  with  surplus 
capacity  becoming  available  as  output  de-
clined, particularly in the steel industry, there 
was less incentive to undertake the installation 
of new plant and  equipment. Consequently, 
capital  expenditures tended  last year to  be 
limited to the replacement of  obsolete or worn-
out  equipment. New investment by  the  services 
sector or by the publicly owned railways was 
less severely curtailed than in industry. 
Residential construction also declined by over 
20 per cent in volume in 1975, largely because 
the bulge in  housing requirements of recent 
years had been met  and the need for new hous-
ing  stabilised  at a lower rate.  A rise  in  con-
struction prices of the order of  15 per cent was 
an  additional element affecting decisions on 
new housing investment. New residential build-
ing permits issued in 1975 declined by 42 per 
cent, and those for new apartments declined 
to an even greater extent. However, after re-
strictions on  the granting of mortgage credit 
had  been  eased  in  September there was  a 
limited revival towards the end of the year in 
the number of new housing units planned. 
The increased emphasis by the Luxembourg 
government on counter-cyclical programmes 
was a principal factor in raising public authority 
investment at current prices by about 22 per 
cent in 1975. This was directed mainly towards 
educational building and equipment, telecom-
munications and infrastructural projects. 
In  contrast to developments in  the two pre-
ceding countries, the fall  in  1975 in  the pro-
portion of total fixed investment in  Denmark 
consisting of investment by enterprises was 
equalled by that of the share of housing con-
struction, though the underlying reasons dif-
fered considerably. The slackening of new in-
vestment by enterprises in the autumn of1974 
continued into the first half of last year. The 
weakening of business confidence by the de-
terioration  in  sales  prospects  at home  and 11 
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abroad was accentuated in March by  the freez-
ing of gross profit margins. However, govern-
ment programmes  allowing  accelerated de-
preciation on new investments, and granting 
tax credits and subsidies,  which were intro-
duced in June and September, moderated the 
decline in  new capital expenditures towards 
the end of1975. Nevertheless, fixed investment 
by enterprises declined by about 15 per cent 
at constant prices last year. Reflecting this, the 
amount  of  new  industrial  and  commercial 
building commenced in 1975 was 35 per cent 
lower than in the previous year. 
Residential  construction  on  the  other  hand 
suffered from the consequences of the very 
• 
Investment of 
public authorities 
low number of housing units started in 1974, 
as the number of houses under construction 
was 33 per cent lower at mid-1975 than in the 
previous year. Residential investment was thus 
reduced by about 17 per cent in volume terms 
in 1975. However, global figures are somewhat 
misleading  in  that activity in  this sector was 
definitely becoming stronger during 1975 and 
the cumulative total of housing starts for 1975 
was  about 30  per cent higher than  in  1974. 
Significant factors in encouraging the upturn in 
new housing investment were the appreciable 
decline of between 4 and 5 percentage points 
in  mortgage interest rates  last year and  the 
introduction by the Government of a number 
of measures to promote residential construc-
tion. 12 
The easing of restrictions on capital expend-
itures by the Central Government in October 
1974,  and  by the local  authorities  in  August 
1974 and in February of last year, as part of an 
overall plan to counter the rise in  unemploy-
ment, particularly in the construction industry, 
culminated in an increase of  around 6 per cent 
in  the  volume  of investment  by  the  public 
authorities for 1975. This was the only area of 
investment to  expand  significantly.  A  major 
programme of public works totalling D.Kr. 650 
million was introduced in September 1975 but 
much of this investment is likely to be made in 
the current year. 
Changes in the sectoral distribution of invest-
ment in France, as recorded at current prices, 
conformed to the general pattern, but were not 
so marked as in some of the smaller Member 
Countries. The proportion of the total formed 
by  fixed  investment by the  business  sector 
shrank  by  only  2  percentage  points  during 
1975, although in  volume terms this category 
of investment fell by 7.2 per cent in comparison 
with 1974. Apart from the food manufacturing 
industry which was able to maintain the level 
of  its  production,  industries  generally  were 
working  below  capacity.  This  was  largely 
because demand was lower but the liquidation 
of the excess stocks built up during 1974 also 
played a part.  In  addition profits were falling 
and the capacity for financing investment from 
internal resources seems in  many instances, 
particularly in the steel and chemical industries, 
to have been impaired. As the outlook did not 
improve until the autumn, there was  little in-
centive for privately-owned businesses to en-
large their productive capacity. Publicly owned 
enterprises, on  the other hand,  invested 13.1 
per cent more in  volume terms than  a year 
earlier,  largely  because  investment  pro-
grammes were accelerated  in  order to help 
restimulate the economy. Most of  the increase 
was  concentrated  in  telecommunications, 
energy and transport and many of the projects 
were  related  to regional  development. As  a 
result of the additional effort made by public 
enterprises, the decline in  investment by the 
business sector was limited to 7.2 per cent. 
The volume of housing construction also fell 
during 1975, by about 5.2 per cent, as a result 
of lower demand. House buyers were under-
standably reluctant to commit themselves to 
paying the higher prices demanded for new 
dwellings while the economic outlook remained 
uncertain  and  borrowing  was  relatively  ex-
pensive.  The  cost  of  building  was  perhaps 
rising a little less rapidly by the end of the year 
as inflationary pressures abated. This together 
with an easing of costs of borrowing from the 
autumn  onwards  probably  helped  to  revive 
house purchases. 
In marked contrast to the performance of  other 
sectors, the public authorities increased the 
volume of their investment by about 9 per cent 
during 1975. This resulted from budgetary pro-
visions which were aimed at restimulating the 
economy.  The  infrastructural  projects  that 
were  financed  in  this  context were  related 
mainly to regional development programmes 
and  laid the foundations for future industrial 
redeployment. 
In 1975 fixed investment in each sector in Italy 
suffered  to a greater extent than  in  France 
though  there  were similarities  in  the overall 
pattern. Fixed capital expenditures by Italian 
enterprises rose by about 1 per cent at current 
prices during 1975, which implied a decline in 
volume of about 15 per cent. Business invest-
ment was particularly affected in the early part 
of the year by the carry-over of the effects of 
credit restrictions that had been implemented 
in 197  4. Private sector companies were more 
affected than the state-supported enterprises 
which not only were in a more privileged position 
insofar as obtaining funds was concerned, but 
deliberately avoided cutting back their invest-
ment, particularly in the less developed regions, 
so  as  not to be seen to be hindering official 
counter-cyclical  policy.  Furthermore,  funds 
borrowed abroad by State enterprises during 
1973 and 1974  at the request of authorities, 
and which had been required to be deposited with the central bank, were progressively re-
leased to the borrowers. 
Residential construction was similarly affected 
by the legacy of high borrowing costs of the 
previous year, and of the difficulties in obtain-
ing mortgage funds. New housing units started 
were sharply lower towards the end of 1974 
and during 1975 as  a whole,  so  that work in 
progress was reduced last year. Construction 
costs of new housing had risen quite sharply 
in 1974 and this,  in  conjunction with the rent 
freeze in  force during the year, no doubt cut 
into the profitability of providing new rented 
accomodation. Investment in  new residential 
construction declined by nearly 10 per cent in 
volume terms but rose by 6.5 per cent in value. 
While the Central  Government set aside (in 
August) an  additional sum of Lit. 600 milliard 
for the promotion of social housing, it seems 
evident that the  benefits of this  injection  of 
funds had not been felt by end-1975. 
Investment expenditure by the public author-
ities, in rising in value by 12.6 per cent in 1975, 
was  the least affected by the economic re-
cession. However, there was probably a small 
reduction in  the volume of fixed investment, 
which would represent a continuation of the 
declining trend of recent years. The counter-
cyclical fiscal measures introduced during the 
spring  and  summer included  an  amount of 
Lit.  1000 milliard for increasing public works 
(notably hospitals) but because of the inevitable 
time  lag  in  activating  such  investment  pro-
grammes, they had little impact on the out-turn 
for1975. 
In Belgium, a carry-over of investment activity 
in the business and housing sectors helped to 
soften the impact of the recession but other-
wise the experience of  the various sectors con-
formed to the general pattern. A decline in the 
capacity utilization ratio from 85.1  per cent in 
May 1974 to only 71  per cent in October last 
year tended to be concentrated in certain in-
dustries. In the steel, chemical and textile in-
dustries trading  conditions were  particularly 
difficult but in contrast the automotive industry 
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had  a good year and  the services sector in 
general  was  less  affected by the recession. 
Rising unemployment moreover did not reflect 
the full extent of the deterioration in capacity 
utilization which led to reduced productivity on 
account  of the  lower  output,  and  was  ac-
companied  by  substantially  higher  labour 
costs and narrowed profit margins. The general 
outlook discouraged embarking on new invest-
ment projects and the volume of capital ex-
penditure would have been even less but for 
the completion of  existing projects. In the event, 
investments  by  enterprises  declined  by 
between three and  four per cent in  1975  in 
constant price terms; but in value terms, invest-
ments rose by about seven per cent. 
The volume of residential capital expenditures 
would  likewise  have  been  lower but for the 
carry-over of construction work which had a 
long  lead  time.  Building  permits for housing 
construction slackened markedly towards the 
end  of 1974 and for the first nine months of 
1975 were 26 per cent below the comparable 
1974  period.  The  housing  market in  general 
suffered a reaction from the strong demand 
conditions experienced in 1973 and 197  4. High 
mortgage rates, the rapid increase in construc-
tion costs and the downturn of the economy 
tended to reduce the demand for new housing 
below that prevailing in earlier years. In view of 
this  evident slackening, and  the prospect of 
rising  unemployment  in  the  construction 
sector, the public authorities instituted a series 
of measures  during  the course  of the year, 
initially easing,  and  finally abolishing the  re-
strictive measures carried over as  a residue 
from the expansive period in 1974.1n addition, 
the public authorities introduced an expanded 
programme  of social  housing  which  helped 
sustain the rhythm of activity of housing con-
struction. Total  residential investment never-
theless decreased in real terms by about 3 per 
cent in 1975 which represented a sharp con-
traction  from  the  11  per cent growth of the 
previous year. Price inflation in this sector, at 
16 per cent last year, continued to be a problem. 
Public authority capital expenditures showed 14 
Table 3 -Shares of capital investment in Community countries (1) 
Gross fixed investment 
Gross 
National  Sectoral shares in % 
Product 
Countries  at current  As  o/o  of 
market  gross  Housing  Investment  national  Business  prices 
product  investment  construe- by public 
tion  authorities 
Germany, DM milliards  1974  997.0  22  59  23  18 
1975  1 043.6  21  60  21  19 
France, FF milliards  1974  1 281.0  27  61  27  12 
1975  1 405.0  26  59  27  14 
United Kingdom, £ millions  1974  82333  20  64  19  17 
1975  103 039  20  65  20  15 
Italy, Lit. milliards  1974  99056  23  58  29  13 
1975  111809  21  56  29  15 
Netherlands, Fl. milliards  1974  188.1  22  58  25  17 
1975  204.3  21  58  24  18 
Belgium, BF. milliards  1974  2105.6  22  58  28  14 
1975  2348.8  22  56  29  15 
Denmark, Kr. milliards  1974  186.95  22  56  24  20 
1975  206.55  20  54  22  24 
Ireland, £ millions  1974  2928  25  58  25  17 
1975  3561  23  54  28  18 
Luxembourg, Flux. milliards 
1974  82.28  25  53  24  23 
1975  79.34  27  51  21  28 
Total Community 
u. a. milliards  1974  975.6  23  60  25  15 
1975  1 082.5  22  60  24  16 
(1)  This table is based on estimates, at current prices, of orders of magnitude. Strict comparisons of gross 
fixed investment cannot validly be made because of differences of definition and composition from one 
Member Country to another. 
a relatively low growth in real terms of 2.4 per 
cent in 1975 despite the extensive investment 
programmes put forward by the Government 
during the year. To some extent this tendency 
was due to the normal lag between the initiation 
of projects and  the commencement of con-
struction,  and  to  some  extent to  delays  in 
obtaining legislative approval for investment 
programmes. 
In contrast to the majority of countries capital 
expenditure by enterprises in the Netherlands 
maintained its position in  relation to such ex-
penditure in other  sectors in 1975, but its volume 
declined further, by about 4.8 per cent follow-
ing a reduction of only 0.1  per cent in 1974. In 
the last quarter of 1975 there was a more than 
seasonal increase in business investment but 
for the greater part of the year capital expend-
itures were pruned or postponed because of 
the existence of surplus  capacity and  poor 
business  conditions.  The  rise  in  input costs 
combined with lower export sales and price 
controls on the domestic market resulted in a 
severe deterioration in  the profit margins of 
enterprises in 1975.1t has been estimated that 
a fairly large proportion of Dutch companies 
were only a little above break-even point, but 
with some companies in industries particularly 
affected by the  recession  registering  heavy 
losses. There was a tendency, as in 1974, for 
new  capital  investment to  take the  form  of labour saving machinery and equipment. This 
often involved replacing equipment which was 
becoming obsolescent at an  increasing pace 
and resulted in new investment taking place in 
capital-intensi"ve  rather than labour-intensive 
industries. 
The decline in the volume of residential con-
struction of 6.8 per cent last year was smaller 
than the 12.8 per cent recorded the previous 
year but, as this was due to improved statistics 
of construction, it should not be interpreted as 
a slowing of  the downtrend which resulted from 
a virtual over-supply of  housing in the early part 
of the decade. 0 n a small scale, there has also 
been shift in the form of supply from new con-
struction to the renovation of  old houses. There 
were 120800 new dwellings completed in 1975 
which  compares  with  an  average  of about 
150000 units completed in each ofthe  previous 
three  years.  The  number  of  housing  units 
started had declined sharply in 1974 and the 
lower overall demand for housing continued 
into 1975. The reduced activity in construction, 
both  residential  and  non-residential,  would 
probably  have  been  greater but for special 
government programmes to counteract this 
and the rise in the number of unemployed. 
An  important part of the special government 
measures  introduced  in  late 1974 and  early 
1975 was  designed specifically to boost the 
construction sector, often through public works 
programmes in economically retarded regions. 
There was  a considerable injection of funds 
into the economy which contributed to an in-
crease in the public sector financing require-
m  entfrom Fl. 5.1 milliard in 197  4 to an estimated 
Fl. 9.9 milliard last year. Nevertheless, the ex-
pansion  of public authority investments last 
year reversed a decline in this sector  which had 
persisted for a number of years. Capital ex-
penditures by the public authorities rose by 4 
per cent in volume terms in 1975 and by about 
14 per cent at current prices. 
Business investment in Germany continued to 
be affected adversely during a large part of 
1975 by the cyclical decline in sales and output 
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which had begun a year earlier, but appeared 
to be more resistantthan in most  other  Member 
States, including the Netherlands. It accounted 
for a larger proportion of  total fixed investment 
in the German economy than in the previous 
year and by the last quarter of 1975 was even 
rising  sharply  in  volume.  The  favourable  in-
fluence of  reductions in raw material prices and 
a distinctly smaller wage increase in the 1975 
round of wage negotiations were insufficient, 
at least in the earlier part of the year, to com-
pensate for the effect on investment intentions 
of seasonally declining sales, falling output, a 
negligible rise in productivity and the generally 
uncertain economic outlook. In the second half 
of the year, however, the prospects for invest-
ment improved as sales picked up. Investment 
in machinery  and equipment began to increase 
after mid-year and the influence carried through 
to industrial and  commercial building during 
the fourth quarter. In the fourth quarter also, 
construction  permits  granted  increased  by 
around 30 per cent compared with the same 
period of the previous year.  The investment 
grant scheme continued to be a major factor 
behind this improvement, because some build-
ing  permits,  requested  before the end-June 
expiry of the scheme, were not issued until the 
fourth quarter. Taking 1975 as  a whole, how-
ever,  total business capital expenditures de-
clined by about 3.3 per cent at constant prices. 
With price inflation much reduced,  business 
investment  at  current  prices  increased  by 
about 0.6 per cent. 
Residential investment in Germany fell again 
during1975, the decline being about10percent 
when  measured at current prices and about 
12.4 per cent at constant prices. Housing units 
started during 1975 were very much reduced 
from  the  record  number started  two  years 
earlier, but were beginning to recover some-
what in the fourth quarter of last year. Demand 
from private house-buyers was relatively good 
but not strong enough to offset the contraction 
in  housing construction by the public sector 
and  by property owners for the purpose of 
renting. 16 
Following the major  effort  made by  the German 
public authorities in 1974 when they increased 
their fixed investment by over 20 per cent in 
value and about 11  per cent in volume in order 
to  counteract  recessionary  influences,  the 
further  growth  in  investment  in  this  sector 
during 1975 of 2 per cent in volume and 4.5 per 
cent in value was relatively modest. The very 
much higher public sector borrowing require-
ment in 1975 at DM 65 milliard, compared with 
the DM 24 milliard required the previous year, 
was not attributable to the implementation of 
Government  investment  programmes  but 
mainly to social security payments. 
For a variety of reasons, including the general 
effect of a  historically high  rate  of inflation 
which exceeded that in other Member  Countries, 
the pattern of expenditure at current prices on 
fixed investment in the United Kingdom during 
1975 differed from patterns established else-
where. The share of enterprises and of house-
building rose while that of  the public authorities 
fell. In terms of volume, however, the relatively 
small 1.5 per cent decline in  business capital 
expenditures covers a divergence of trends in 
its  various  sub-sectors.  The  volume  of new 
investment  in  the  m~nufacturing industries 
declined abruptly during 1975, by 13.9 per cent, 
or to about the same extent as during the pre-
vious year. This reduction stemmed principally 
from the adverse trading conditions, in volume 
terms,  both  on  the  domestic market and  in 
export sales. With the decline in industrial out-
put last year, the proportion of companies re-
porting  their operations  as  being  below full 
capacity reached a record of 78 per cent as of 
January 1976. In addition, the need for enter-
prises  to bring  financial  commitments more 
into line with their available cash flow which, 
despite inflation, was often no higher in 1975 
than in previous years, resulted in a closer ap-
praisal of the likely return on capital projects. 
This was made more pressing since the impact 
of price inflation of the order of 27 per cent on 
capital investment expenditures was particular-
ly severe last year. 
Certain  measures  were  introduced  by  the 
government in late 1974 and during the course 
of last year to boost investment, particularly in 
the manufacturing industries, but these seem 
to have had only a marginal effect  in slowing the 
decline in business capital expenditures general-
ly.  Nevertheless, one area of expansion was 
that of capital equipment for the development 
of oil and gas supplies. With the onset of the 
production phase of North Sea development, 
expenditures  on  extraction  equipment,  port 
facilities, pipelines and processing plants for 
gas and oil have assumed some importance 
in the overall pattern of business investment in 
the United Kingdom. The nationalised industries 
also increased their capital spending in  con-
stant price terms by more than 10 per cent in 
1975. 
Residential capital expenditures last year re-
covered some of  the ground lost in the previous 
two years in rising by 6 per cent in volume and 
by  27.5  per cent at current  prices.  Private 
housebuilding was relatively more expansive 
than that of the public sector, with new housing 
units started during 1975  being  40 per cent 
higher than in the previous year compared with 
an increase of 13 per cent in the public sector. 
The private housing market thus experienced a 
limited  recovery  from  the  very  depressed 
conditions existing in 1974. This improvement 
may have been due, in part, to the slower rise 
in new house prices than in previous years (and 
slower than the rise in incomes), and in part to 
the ready availability of  funds from the Building 
Societies. Nevertheless, a relatively large stock 
of completed but unsold houses continued to 
hang over the private residential market at the 
end of 1975 and the volume of investment was 
still about one-sixth below the peak in 1972. 
Non-residential  capital  expenditures  by  the 
public authorities declined by 3.3 per cent in 
volume last year,  but rose by 16 per cent at 
current prices. It appears the growing financial 
deficit of  the authorities stemmed, in the United 
Kingdom as in Germany, from the expansion of 
current expenditures, associated in  part with 
counter-recessionary  policies,  rather  than 
from the increase in capital spending. CHAPTER  2 
FINANCING OF INVESTMENT 
2.1. THE FINANCIAL BACKGROUND 
The problems which had loomed large at the 
beginning of  197  4, inflation and the financing of 
large balance of payments deficits on current 
account, diminished in  size during 1975. The 
rise in prices tended to moderate as demand 
contracted  and  the  most serious  recession 
since the Second World War took hold. At the 
same time the imports of most industrialised 
countries, fell in volume while the oil exporting 
countries began to spend their newly gained 
wealth more freely. This left room for a further 
easing of monetary and fiscal policies in  de-
veloped countries in the interests of  restimulat-
ing economic activity. 
Demand for credit by the private sector re-
mained weak. On the part of businesses, the 
uncertain outlook tended to lead to a running-
down of stocks which lessened the require-
ment for working capital and to an abandonment 
or  a postponement of  investment plans. Private 
individuals, on the other hand, tended to hesitate 
over taking on new commitments while unem-
ployment was  rising  strongly and  to  save a 
higher proportion of their incomes than in the 
recent past. In consequence banking systems 
were generally very liquid. 
Against  this,  the  increased  expenditure  of 
public authorities both on current and capital 
account resulted in a sharp increase in budget-
ary deficits in most countries and to historically 
large  public sector borrowing  requirements. 
The  decline  in  short and  long-term  interest 
rates which occurred during 1975 might have 
been larger but for substantial demands made 
by public authorities for finance from capital 
markets. As it was, short-term interest rates fell 
during 1975 to well  below bond yields on all 
markets, re-establishing a more normal interest 
rate structure than that which had prevailed, in 
many instances, for more than a year.lnvestors 
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accordingly found it profitable once more to 
invest at longer term and towards the end of 
1975 it became possible to launch bond issues 
with longer maturities, even if these maturities 
were not quite as long as  those regarded as 
normal before the inflationary crisis. 
Up  to a point the performance of the inter-
national capital market was similar. Short-term 
interest rates on  euro-currency deposits de-
clined appreciably in  the first five months of 
1975,  but then  rebounded for the next four 
months  before  declining  again  in  the  final 
quarter of the year.  International syndicates 
were not faced, as in 1974, with demands from 
national authorities for massive euro-currency 
credits for the pre-financing of expected oil 
deficits though, on the other hand, they received 
less in the way of deposits fr~m oil exporting 
countries. The  initial  fall  in  short term  aura-
currency rates was nevertheless large enough 
to revive the interest of investors in the euro-
bond  market  where  the  volume  of  issuing 
activity rose  markedly in  1975  and  perhaps 
ruled out  the possibility of  a further fall in longer 
term interest rates. 
The movement towards a lower interest rate 
structure  began  in  France  in  mid-1974.  The 
Netherlands and Germany followed suit within 
a matter of months. Interest rates probably fell 
more in  Denmark than anywhere else in  the 
Community but this was from an exceptionally 
high level. There was also a marked fall in long-
term  interest  rates  in  the  United  Kingdom, 
Ireland and Italy but their movement after the 
first quarter of 1975 was somewhat irregular. 
The  problem  of  inflation  was  beginning  to 
emerge again in Italy at the end of the year, as 
it had from mid-year onwards in Belgium large-
ly under the influence of which interest rates 
rose in the second half of  1975 both in Belgium 
and  in  Luxembourg to end the year more or 
less where they were twelve months earlier. 18 
Table 4 - Methods of financing the fixed investment of enterprises in the Community 
(Provisional) 
(Percentages) 
Annual 
1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  average 
1971-1975 
I.  Depreciation  46.9  47.7'  46.6  51.5  54.4  49.4 
II.  Long and medium-term 
external resources raised on 
national capital markets  15.5  18.0  18.4  11.5  20.0  16.7 
of which:  shares  3.9  4.6  3.9  2.5  4.2  3.8 
bonds  11.6  13.4  14.5  9.0  15.8  12.9 
Ill. Other resources including 
net self-financing and, bank 
and other credits  37.6  34.3  35.0  37.0  25.6  33.9 
Total financing for gross fixed 
capital formation  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
During  1975, fiscal and  monetary policies in 
France were directed increasingly towards re-
stimulating  the economy while avoiding  the 
creation of  new inflationary pressures. In recent 
years the budget has normally been in balance, 
but the need to provoke a revival of economic 
activity led the authorities to budget for  a deficit 
in 1975 of F.fr. 43 milliard, equivalent to 3.4 per 
cent of GOP, and with more than 80 per cent of 
this being financed by the banking system. The 
main  programmes covered by the additional 
expenditure were announced in April and Sep-
tember. In April the decision was taken to inject 
some F.fr. 20 milliard into critical sectors of  the 
economy of which  F.fr.  1 milliard was  to  be 
allocated for lending to public enterprises; only 
F.fr.  6.9 milliard of the total represented new 
money to be obtained from sources external 
to the Government. Also within the overall pro-
gramme,  F.fr.  5 milliard  was  intended to  be 
raised  in  the form of a joint-issue by various 
public institutions and carrying a government 
guarantee, the proceeds of which were to be 
devoted  to the  purchase  of machinery and 
equipment for installation in productive enter-
prises. The measures, totalling F.fr. 30.5 milliard, 
announced in September went further than the 
provision of finance for investment. In addition 
to an amount of F.fr. 15.9 milliard allocated for 
financing public and industrial orotherforms of 
productive  investment,  some F.fr.  5  milliard 
was  earmarked for stimulating consumption 
and the final date for the payment of company 
taxes amounting to F.fr. 9.6 milliard was post-
poned. It seems probable that the September 
measures played a significant role in the bright-
ening  of economic  prospects  in  the  fourth 
quarter of the year. 
Monetary policy also played an important role 
during  1975  in  creating  conditions  which 
favoured  the restimulation  of the- economy. 
Policy had not really been restrictive during the 
last quarter of 197  4 but at the end of the year 
short-term  interest  rates  nevertheless  re-
mained higher than long-term rates, standing 
in an inverse relationship which clearly needed 
to be corrected in the changed circumstances 
of 1975.  The  authorities  were  nevertheless 
anxious  not to impair the progress that had 
been made in combatting inflation and in re-
storing equilibrium in the balance of payments 
on current account. 
The  first  half  of 1975  accordingly  saw  the 
adoption of a series of cautious and selective 
measures to create a climate more favourable 
to investment. It proved  possible to apply a 
further  sharp  stimulus  in  September.  The 
banks' minimum reserve requirements against 
sight deposits were reduced in three stages, in 
January,  June and  September,  from  17  per 
cent at the beginning of the year to 11 per cent by mid-year and to 2 per cent by the end of the 
third quarter, thus freeing a total of  some F.fr. 35 
milliard of resources. Increases in bank credit 
were permitted under a system of progressive 
ceilings on a monthly basis adjusted for  seasonal 
influences. In September these ceilings were 
raised for financial institutions specialising in 
term  credits  in  support  of other  measures 
aimed at a selective stimulation of consumer 
expenditure.  The  structure  of  short-term 
interest rates declined fairly steadily during the 
year and the discount rate ofthe  Bank of  France, 
having been reduced in four steps during the 
first six months of  1975 from 13 per cent to 9.5 
per cent, was cut further in September by 1.5 
per cent to 8 per cent. Meanwhile, in line with 
the intentions of the authorities to reduce the 
cost of  credit to enterprises adversely affected 
by the recession, the easing of  monetary policy 
induced the banks to lower their base lending 
rate in  stages, from 11.9  per cent in January 
1975 to 8.6 per  cent in December. The reduction 
in short-term interest rates on a broad front 
helped to turn the attention of investors from 
the short-term money market to longer term 
placements on the bond market. 
At  the  same  time the substantial  long-term 
capital inflow from abroad which was a feature 
of the balance of payments in 1974, as France 
sought to cover the merchandise trade deficit 
resulting from the increase in  oil prices, dis-
appeared and was replaced by a small outflow 
in 1975. The inflow of short-term capital was, 
however, larger in 1975, and by mid-year the 
strength of the franc facilitated its re-entry, at 
least temporarily, into the European currency 
snake. 
While interest rates in the Netherlands moved 
downwards during 1975 virtually in parallel with 
those in  France, the movement had very dif-
ferent origins. Initially there was a carry-over of 
the effects of rapid monetary expansion in 197  4 
and subsequently the authorities were engaged 
in  promoting  capital  outflows  to  offset  the 
balance of payments surplus on  current ac-
count. The broad objective of monetary policy 
towards the end of 1974 and in early1975 was 
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to lower the growth in the monetary aggregates, 
which had increased rapidly during 1974, as a 
part of overall  anti-inflationary policy. These 
aims were pursued through raising the liquid 
reserve  requirements on  short-term  deposit 
liabilities so  as  to reduce the margin of free 
liquidity of the banks, and the reintroduction 
of a ceiling on credit expansion was actively 
considered. Towards mid-1975, however, the 
rate of growth of credit expansion had flattened 
out and the authorities reduced the liquid re-
serve requirement on short-term deposits  .. In 
addition the target margin of free liquidity was 
raised to a minimum of 2 per cent from the 
0.5-1 per cent which had prevailed since July 
197  4. With a lower pattern of  loan demand from 
the private sector the banking system became 
highly liquid from mid-May onwards. The con-
sequent decline in  interest rates  helped the 
authorities in  persuading the banks to place 
funds abroad, thus increasing their net foreign 
assets.ln this way it  was hoped to avoid a major 
increase in  the country's official external re-
serves which would otherwise result from the 
excess of the current account surplus in the 
balance of  payments over the expected capital 
outflow. The outflow of  funds was also actively 
encouraged by the opening at mid-year of the 
capital market to public placements by foreign 
governments and  private borrowers (private 
placements  had  been  allowed  previously). 
Around  the  same  time  the  local  authorities 
were  granted  direct  access  to  the  capital 
market instead of being required, as in the pre-
ceding  ten  years,  to  seek  funds  only from 
certain specialised credit institutions. 
Bond markets improved until mid-year under 
the influence of a ready supply of capital and 
private, as well as institutional, investors con-
tributed substantially to the better tone. How-
ever, at end-June there was a turning in  the 
market and bond yields tended to rise when it 
was announced that the Government's deficit 
for 1975 would have to be revised  upwards. 
Reductions in discount rate in mid-August and 
mid-September indicated that the authorities 
were still trying to turn away capital inflows. But 20 
by October the demand for credit was reviving 
in  the Netherlands and the banks' obligatory 
reserves were again reduced to zero. 
Interest rates  declined  in  Germany between 
the beginning and end of 1975 but not without 
some tension in the third and part of the fourth 
quarter. A further decline in the rate at which 
prices were increasing left the authorities with 
room  for manoeuvre in  their attempts to re-
stimulate the economy. In the field of  monetary 
policy, the discount rate of  the Bundesbank was 
reduced in stages between February and Sep-
tember by two and a half percentage points to 
3.5 per cent. During the same period the Bun-
desbank's Lombard rate for advances against 
security was brought down even further, from8 
per cent to 4.5 per cent. These moves which 
were sometimes synchronised with increases 
in discount ceilings or releases from the banks' 
legal reserve requirements were aimed initially 
at persuading the banks to reduce their  interest 
rates on term loans which had come down less 
than the interest rates which they had offered 
on  their deposits. The  money supply, widely 
defined  (M  3),  nevertheless  grew  relatively 
slowly at a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 
3.4 per cent during the first half of the year for 
which slackness of loan demand from the busi-
ness sector was largely responsible. 
Towards the middle of the year, however, in-
vestors  began  to expect an  up-turn in  long-
term interest rates. The main reason was the 
fear that an additional strain would be placed 
on the bond market by the covering of  financial 
deficits in supplementary budgets introduced 
by the Federal Government and some of the 
Lander.  Investors  were  also  disturbed  by a 
temporary rise in  the rate of inflation around 
mid-year. A third factor was a rise in long-term 
interest rates in some external capital markets. 
In order to give the bond market  an opportunity 
to regain  its  strength,  it was  closed  to  new 
issues by public sector borrowers from 11 July 
until almost the end of the year. The Federal 
Government announced plans for improving 
the structure of its  budget and  for avoiding 
deficits  over a  period  of several  years  but, 
during the suspension of new issues, it covered 
its  borrowing  requirements  by  placing  debt 
certificates and Treasury bills with financing 
institutions up  to August and by  resorting there-
after  to  obtaining  loans  from  the  banking 
system. An  increase in  money supply (M  3) 
during the second half of the year at an annual 
rate of  13.8 per cent eased the task of  the public 
authorities in raising the necessary finance. 
The  impact  of external  transactions  during 
1975 on the capital market was quite minor. 
The reduction over the year as a whole of the 
net outflow of capital was partly attributable to 
the steps taken at the end of August to allow 
banks to pay the same interest rates on non-
resident deposits as on resident deposits, and 
to borrow  abroad on behalf of  public authorities 
through placings of notes, though it is a little 
early to judge the precise effect. Thus the open-
market operations of  the Bundesbank to which 
the  authorities  found  it necessary to  resort 
during the third and part of the fourth quarter 
were  occasioned  mainly  by  the  weakened 
confidence of domestic investors. These open-
market operations  which  reached a total of 
OM 8 milliard by the time they were suspended 
in the fourth week of October, were success-
ful  in  that they  prevented  yields  on  bonds 
issued by public sector borrowers from rising 
more than marginally on the secondary market. 
When  towards  the  end  of  the  year  public 
sector  borrowers  were  again  permitted  to 
launch new bond issues, a part of the public 
sector's financial  requirements for 1976 had 
been  covered  and  the  market itself was  in 
better shape,  being  willing to accept longer-
dated securities than previously. 
Interest rates also fell in Denmark during 1975 
but their starting point was higher than in any of 
the three preceding countries. Monetary policy 
was broadly accomodating in the latter part of 
1974 and during last year in that credit ceilings 
were repeatedly raised - by a cumulative total 
of 10 per cent between November 1974 and 
December 1975- so as to avoid placing any 
constraint on bank lending which might retard 
a  recovery  in  business  activity.  While  loan Table 5 - Financing of the non-government 
sector from the domestic market 
and banking sources 
{milliard units of account) 
Country  1972  1973  1974  1975 
Germany  30.63  27.50  23.65  17.42 
France  22.09  22.53  24.16  27.88 
United Kingdom  21.67  20.73  14.07  8.36 
Italy  15.75  20.97  14.13  18.42 
Netherlands  5.17  6.75  8.10  7.94 
Belgium  2.92  3.35  3.61  4.22 
Denmark  2.77  3.51  3.07  3.44 
Ireland  0.68  0.59  0.42  0.53 
Luxembourg  -(a)  0.18  0.28  0.28 
Total 
Community  101.68  106.11  91.49  88.49 
of which: shares  5.05  5.40  3.84  6.82 
bonds  4.61  3.30  2.03  5.14 
short, medium 
and long-term 
credits  92.03  97.41  85.62  76.53 
(a) Estimates are incomplete 
commitments rose moderately, actual utiliza-
tion of credit lines barely increased at all owing 
to the slowing in business activity. On the other 
hand there was extensive liquidity in the finan-
cial  system  as  personal  savings  were  ex-
ceptionally high in 1975. The ready availability 
of funds, combined with the low demand for 
credit, enabled the financial institutions to take 
up a much larger amount of new issues on the 
bond market at interest rates below those of 
the previous year. Much of  the liquidity stemmed 
from the sharp increase in the Central Govern-
ment's budget deficit. The need to finance this 
in  a  non-inflationary  manner  prompted  the 
Government to embark on a very large D.Kr. 6 
milliard programme of bond issues under the 
favourable conditions which existed during the 
summerandearlyautumn.Asafurthermeasure 
to  reduce liquidity, the banks were  required 
from November until the end of the fiscal year 
at the end of March 1976 to place special re-
serve deposits with the central bank. 
An important facet of Danish monetary policy 
in recent years has been the need to maintain 
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a strong inflow of capital from abroad in  the 
form  of business  and  financial  loans  to  the 
private sector. This has been necessary to off-
set the current account deficit of the balance 
of payments and to maintain the country's ex-
ternal reserves. Thus, the monetary authorities 
have had to maintain a delicate balance in credit 
policy, in providing adequate liquidity  to finance 
a revival of activity while not allowing interest 
rates to fall too far.lf too easy, terms for  borrow-
ing on the domestic market could encourage 
some switching from foreign markets. 
The next three countries, the United Kingdom, 
Ireland and Italy also experienced a decline in 
interest rates during 1975, though they were 
grappling with rather more serious inflationary 
problems than others. In the United Kingdom, 
the financial setting last year was dominated 
by the extent of price inflation, and its con-
sequent impact on financial assets and on the 
external competitive position. As  noted in an 
earlier section, retail prices rose by 25 per cent 
in 1975, which was at least twice as much as in 
any continental Community country. Capital 
markets, however, provided more funds than 
in  1974.  Individuals  greatly  expanded  their 
savings with the financial intermediaries even 
though there was a negative real rate of return. 
The  external  financing  requirements  of  in-
dustrial and commercial companies were sub-
stantially  reduced  through  cutting  back  ex-
penditures  on  fixed  investment and  not re-
placing  stocks.  Capital  markets  were  also 
aided,  more  particularly  from  mid-year  on-
wards,  by greater optimism that the govern-
ment's  incomes  policy would  be  successful 
and that inflation would decline. 
The  growing size of the public sector deficit 
was a major concern to the financial community. 
Despite direct tax increases in  April, and so-
called  "fiscal  drag"  (the tendency of tax re-
venues to rise faster than incomes as  these 
become liable for tax at increasing rates), the 
public sector borrowing requirement rose by 
49 per cent in the calendar year 1975 to£  10.45 
milliard. The monetary authorities followed a 
course of trying to meet this requirement in a 22 
non-inflationary  manner  through  the  bond 
market,  but  at  the  same  time  maintaining 
monetary expansion and interest rates at levels 
which  would  accommodate an  eventual  re-
covery in investment demand. Recourse to the 
bond market by the Central Government was 
thus very considerably increased, but the up-
take of issues was  eased  by the carry-over 
from  the  previous year of a high  degree of 
liquidity among non-bank institutions. The U.K. 
market was encouraged by declining rates of 
interest in  other financial centres and by the 
growing evidence that inflationary pressures 
were being overcome. This paved the way for 
a reduction in short-term interest rates on the 
domestic market which, in turn, encouraged a 
move into longer-term  commitments on  the 
part of investors. 
The  downward  movement of interest rates, 
however, was circumscribed by the need to 
maintain an interest rate differential in favour 
of  sterling. Most  ofthe  depreciation ofthe pound 
sterling during 1975 as a whole of about 11 per 
cent occurred during May and June and short-
term interest rates which had moved lower in 
the first quarter of 1975, were forced upwards 
by  the monetary  authorities during the summer 
as  a defensive measure against a continued 
slide in  the exchange rate.  In  order to allow 
greater room for manoeuvre with respect to 
interest  differentials  between  the  domestic 
market and abroad, the U.K. Government de-
cided to apply to the International Monetary 
Fund, towardstheendoftheyear,  for  additional 
reserve  backing amounting to some$ 2000 
million of which  $  700  million was  drawn  in 
December and the balance in January 1976. 
The  year-on-year increase in  retail  prices in 
Ireland of nearly 17 per cent to November 1975 
was appreciably less than in the United King-
dom  but  nominal  interest  rates  in  the  two 
countries  continued  to  move  in  parallel.  An 
expansion of 55 per cent in the public sector 
borrowing requirement in 1975 resulted largely 
from  the growth of expenditure directed to-
wards  restimulating  the  economy.  Money 
supply on  a wide definition (M  3)  increased 
during 1975 by 20 per cent while GNP expressed 
in current prices rose by 21.5 per cent; this was 
broadly in line with the original target of  monetary 
policy which was that the increase in the two 
indicators should be of the same order. 
Credit ceilings were raised at the end of 1974 
and the official discount rate was lowered in 
two steps in January and March 1975, from 12 
per cent to 10 per  cent. The deposit and lending 
rates of  the main Irish banks were also reduced. 
The potential inflationary impact of the public 
sector deficit was, however, rather less than it 
might have been because nearly one-third of it 
was  covered  by  borrowing  from  domestic 
investors other than banks. Almost the same 
amount was financed by medium-term borrow-
ing from abroad. 
The  easing of monetary policy, slackness of 
demand for credit on  the part of the private 
sector, and a larger volume of private saving 
contributed towards a better climate on  the 
capital market. The structure of interest rates 
continued to be influenced by conditions on 
the London market but,  subject to this  con-
straint, long-term rates fell in the first quarter 
of 1975 and did not rise again until the fourth 
quarter by which time a number of issues had 
been  successfully floated  by enterprises as 
well  as  by the public authorities. Enterprises 
also found it possible to raise some new share 
capital in 1975, but the capital market remained 
only a minor source of finance for the business 
sector in comparison with bank credits. 
The rise in retail prices in Italy in 1975 of just 
over 11  per cent represented  a marked  im-
provement on performance in 1974 but signs 
that this reduction would turn out to be only 
temporary were beginning to appear by the 
end  of the year.  The  underlying problems in 
Italy thus  bore a degree of resemblance to 
those in the United Kingdom and Ireland. From 
the very beginning of 1975 a large number of 
measures were introduced by the Italian au-
thorities  in  relaxation  of  the  previously  re-
strictive credit and monetary policies. The 15 
per cent ceiling on the growth of bank credit was eased and finally abolished at end-March, 
although a general limitation on the expansion 
of  credit,  as  agreed  with  the  International 
Monetary Fund, was maintained. At the same 
time the non-interest-bearing import deposit 
scheme whereby 50 per cent of the cost of 
selected imports were frozen with the Bank of 
Italy was  phased  out and  these funds  were 
released gradually to the economy. The liquidity 
of the banking system was expanded further 
with the release of  Lit. 300 milliard of  obligatory 
reserves in January. A simultaneous modifica-
tion  of the  system  of reserve  requirements 
had a broadly neutral effect. Also in January 
an agreement was reached among the major 
commercial banks to limit interest rates pay-
able  on  deposit accounts. The  Bank of Italy 
reinforced this agreement by giving rediscount-
ing priority  to those banks lowering their deposit 
rates. In consequence the rate of interest on 
inter-bank deposits declined steeply from 17.5 
per cent in December 1974 to 9.8 per cent in 
June  of last  year,  and  subsequently  drifted 
lower to 8.3 per cent by end-year. A factor con-
tributing to the continued decline in rates was 
that substantial amounts of funds were made 
available by the central bank for the financing, 
at very low cost, of short-term export credits 
by the banking system. It seems probable that 
the low demand for credit resulting from the 
fall  in  domestic business activity and  invest-
ment also played an important part in the de-
cline in interest rates. 
Concomitant with the easing of credit restric-
tions, the authorities set out to encourage the 
transfer of savings into the bond markets so as 
to facilitate the financing of both the increased 
government deficit  and the capital needs of  the 
business sector. The banks were required to 
invest  40  per cent of their new deposits  in 
bonds within  a stipulated  period which  thus 
assured a continuing flow of funds to the mar-
ket.  This  bond-holding  requirement  was  re-
duced to 30 per cent of new deposits for the 
period from end-May to end-November of last 
year. However, owing to the slack demand for 
bank loans, there is  some evidence that the 
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banks took up more than the amount of bonds 
required as a proportion of new deposits. Never-
theless the reduction in long-term bond yields 
was modest in comparison with that of short-
term interest rates in the banking system and 
so a general inducement emerged for investors 
to place funds directly on the bond market. 
A central feature of the financial scene in Italy 
in the past few years has been the growth in 
the public sector deficit. In 1975 the borrowing 
requirement almost doubled to about Lit.16600 
milliard  compared  with just under Lit.  9000 
milliard in the previous year. This was despite 
undertakings,  given  in  connection  with  the 
funding  in  1974 of an  earlier short-term loan 
fromtheCommunityintoamedium-termcredit, 
to try to hold the public sector deficit in 1975 
below Lit.15000 milliard. Much of  the financing 
of the deficit, as in the previous year, took the 
form of  additions to the monetary base through 
the issuance of government securities to the 
Bank· of Italy,  amounting  to  some  Lit.  7000 
milliard. 
After a promising beginning to the year, finan-
cial  conditions  in  Belgium  deteriorated to a 
greater extent in the second half of 1975 than 
in  other Member States. At the start of 1975 
monetary policy was  geared  to  combatting 
excess  demand pressures through relatively 
high interest rates and credit restrictions; but 
within a month the monetary authorities were 
already turning towards lowering the official 
discount  rate  and  other  interest  rates,  and 
raising  rediscount  quotas.  The  new,  easier, 
orientation of policy in the direction of  support-
ing economic activity was pursued throughout 
the remainder of 1975, as was  evidenced by 
the successive lowering of  the official discount 
rate in  five steps from 8.75 per cent in  early 
January to 6 per cent in  August where it re-
mained for the rest of the year. 
Following the reduction in official interest rates, 
the rate on day-to-day money declined from 
6.47  per cent in  January to 3.94 per cent in 
December of last year.  Yields  on  long-term 
bonds issued by public sector borrowers did 24 
not respond to the same extent and were only 
slightly lower at 8. 7 per cent in December  1975 
than the 9.0 per cent at  which they stood a year 
earlier, though they reached a low point of 8.1 
per cent in  June 1975. The  reasons why the 
strong  flow of personal  savings  and  a  high 
availability of liquid funds in financial institutions 
did not bring about a significant fall in  yields 
were various.  Fears  of inflation  in  a year  in 
which  consumer prices  rose  by 11  per cent 
played an important part; they were reinforced 
by the failure to secure legislative approval by 
the  year's  end  for proposals,  introduced  in 
September,  to  limit increases  in  wages  and 
salaries. The public sector borrowing require-
ment which reached B.fr. 141 milliard in the first 
ten months of the year compared with B.fr. 83 
milliard in the comparable period in 197  4 was 
substantially augmented by the introduction 
of counter-recessionary  fiscal  measures  in-
stituted by the Government and its size was 
cause for concern. Investors were also plainly 
disturbed by the uncertainty of the economic 
outlook in Belgium and hence preferred to re-
main liquid. 
Because of the monetary union between the 
two countries, financial conditions in Belgium 
influenced those in  Luxembourg to a certain 
extent. For much of last year the Luxembourg 
monetary authorities, whose scope for inter-
vention tends to be rather limited, pursued a 
restrictive credit policy aimed at reducing price 
inflation. Gradually, as the economic recession 
deepened and the threat of  unemployment be-
came more acute, restrictions on the availability 
of mortgage credits  were  eased  and  finally 
abandoned. On the other hand, limitations on 
the  availability of consumer credit from  the 
banking system were maintained throughout 
the year. 
The  banking system's search for investment 
outlets contributed to a remarkable upsurge in 
activity on the bond market where new issues 
by both domestic and foreign enterprises were 
very much higher than in recent years. For their 
part,  borrowers were encouraged by the de-
cline of  about one percentage point in the yield 
on new issues in the first half of the year. 
2.2. FINANCING IN THE COMMUNITY 
COUNTRIES BY SECTOR: 
PERSONAL AND CORPORATE SAVINGS, 
NEW CAPITAL ISSUES 
ON DOMESTIC MARKETS, 
BANK AND OTHER CREDITS 
TO THE NON-GOVERNMENT SECTOR 
One of the outstanding features of 1975 was 
the strong revival of issuing activity on  bond 
markets. As can be seen in Table 6, net bond 
issues on national markets during 1975 totalled 
55.37 milliard units of  account or  32.78 milliard 
more than  in  the  previous  year.  The  public 
authorities took  18.33 milliard, or  more than half 
of this  increase,  in  covering their borrowing 
requirements which were enlarged by the im-
plementation of measures to revive economic 
activi!Y· Credit institutions also borrowed more 
in 1975 in accounting for 11.34 milliard of the 
growth  in  bond  issues;  they were evidently 
encouraged to build up their resources by the 
decline of interest rates on most markets. 
The  behaviour of enterprises towards raising 
capital,  on  the other hand,  appears to have 
been influenced by the slowing of investment 
activity as well as by the improvement of con-
ditions on capital markets. They raised a net 
5.14  milliard  units  of account  against  bond 
issues during 1975 compared with just over 2 
milliard the previous year. Share issues during 
1975 were appreciably higher, at 6.82 milliard 
units  of  account,  than  in  1974  when  they 
amounted to 3.84 milliard. This might suggest 
that  a  number of companies  improved  the 
structure of their balance sheets in  nominal 
terms but to put the matter in perspective the 
totals of bond and share issues by enterprises 
should  be  compared  with  new credits from 
financial institutions of 76.53 milliard units of 
account in  1975 (see  Table  5).  The  total  of 
credits was admittedly 11  per cent lower than 
that recorded in 197  4, but, as it includes short-25 
Table 6 - Net domestic public Issues of securities 
Type of Securities  1972 
Shares  8.95 
of which: 
Credit institutions  1.90 
Enterprises  5.05 
Bond issues  27.02 
of which: 
Public authorities  6.79 
Credit institutions  15.62 
Enterprises  4.61 
Total Community  33.97 
term credit for the financing of stocks, it was 
probably affected by the running down of in-
ventories last year.  It therefore seems likely 
that any improvement that there might have 
been in company balance sheets, disregarding 
the  deterioration  resulting  from  prolonged 
price  inflation,  would  have  been  minor and 
temporary. 
Capital markets benefited during 1975, espe-
cially  towards  the  end  of the  year,  from  a 
general rise in personal savings. The increase 
in  such savings seems mainly to have had a 
precautionary  motive  stemming  from  the 
growing threat of unemployment but it may 
also have been partly an adjustment to a higher 
level  of prices  and  incomes.  Whatever  the 
motive for the saving, investors tended to be 
hesitant at various times during 1975 and to 
wait until the economic outlook was less un-
certain  before  committing  themselves  to 
purchases of longer term securities. Company 
profits on the other hand seem to have suffered 
from reduced output, keener price competition 
and rising costs, particularly those of  labour. 
The bond market in Italy recovered to a greater 
extent in 1975 than those in any other Member 
State (see  Table  8).  Share  issues  were also 
higher (see Table  7)  even though the Italian 
market was the only one in the Community on 
which prices fell. The total of new issues on the 
United Kingdom  market in  fixed  interest se-
curities was impressive but here the scene was 
(milliard units of account) 
1973  1974  1975 
6.62  4.84  8.40 
1.22  1.00  1.58 
5.40  3.84  6.82 
38.87  22.59  55.37 
12.38  5.58  23.91 
21.19  14.98  26.32 
3.30  2.03  5.14 
43.49  27.43  63.77 
dominated by the borrowing operations of the 
public authorities and the share market served 
enterprises better. In spite of being closed to 
new  issues  by  public  sector  borrowers  for 
several  months,  the German  capital  market 
absorbed a much larger volume of new bond 
issues than in recent years. Enterprises, which 
were net redeemers of bonded debt tended 
instead to raise funds through share issues. In 
France, on  the other hand, the bond market 
was a useful source of capital for enterprises 
in 1975 but new share issues fell back despite 
rising prices on the secondary market. In Den-
mark it was the credit institutions followed by the 
public authorities who were the main benefici-
aries  of improved  issuing  conditions on  the 
bond market, whereas in Belgium the reverse 
was true. In Denmark enterprises again raised 
relatively little by way of bond issues and  in 
Belgium  they raised less than  in 1974; share 
issues were reduced in both countries but net 
bank credits rose. The increase in the volume 
of capital  raised  on  the Netherlands market 
was  more modest but the public authorities, 
credit institutions and non-financial enterprises 
all derived some benefit; share issues also in-
creased in 1975. Activity in  1975 on the fixed 
interest security markets of  Ireland and Luxem-
bourg was small in relation to that  on other mar-
kets but new issues in Ireland virtually trebled 
in comparison with the previous year, while in 
Luxembourg the net amount raised represented 
a swing from a net redemption of bonds in 197  4. 26 
Turning to the pattern of financing in individual 
countries,  a  resurgence  of issue activity on 
capital markets following the difficulties in 197  4 
was  an  important means of financing invest-
ment in Italy last year. New bond issues by non-
financial enterprises rose to Lit. 1396  milliard in 
1975 from Lit. 96 milliard in the previous year, 
with both public and private enterprises sharing 
in this expansion. Specialised credit institutions 
which are important as a source of finance in-
creased their new issues last year by 162 per 
cent to Lit. 5 638 milliard. The public sector also 
took advantage  of the improved  issue  con-
ditions in raising over four times the amount of 
bonds last year as in 1974. The high degree of 
liquidity of the commercial banks and there-
quirement that a  certain  proportion  of new 
deposits be invested in securities provided a 
sound  base for increased market activity. In 
addition the yields prevailing on the bond mar-
ket which, at least from the summer months 
onwards, were high in comparison with interest 
rates on deposits, attracted a greater participa-
tion by the non-bank public. Despite the de-
cline in share values from March/  April onwards 
the equity market provided almost 80 per cent 
more capital in 1975, to the benefit principally 
of non-financial enterprises. 
The  amount of new savings available in  the 
form  of increased savings  deposits with the 
banks  and  savings  institutions  more  than 
doubled in 1975, in rising by 110 per cent. As in 
197  4 there was a tendency in the first half of 
the  year  for  new  savings  to  flow  into  time 
deposits  rather  than  traditional  savings  de-
posits.  However,  as  short-term  money  and 
deposit rates  declined towards the summer 
months, time deposit accounts lost some of 
their attraction in relation to both longer-term 
savings accounts and to the placing of funds 
directly with  the bond  market.  In  the fourth 
quarter of 1975 the Government initiated are-
duction in direct taxation, backdated to January 
1, 1975, to compensate for the effects of in-
flation. This resulted in a considerable boost to 
disposable incomes late in the year, much of 
which  was  retained  in  the  form  of savings. 
Corporate  profitability,  on  the  other  hand, 
suffered from the effect of the business  re-
cession. At the same time labour costs con-
tinued to move upwards rapidly in 1975 and, 
taken in conjunction with lower  output, resulted 
in a 34 per cent rise in unit labour costs. With 
average capacity utilization at only 68 per cent 
in the third quarter of last year, the operating 
rates of many plants probably fell below the 
break-even point. In  recognition of the pres-
sures on business profitability the government 
introduced, towards the end of1975, measures 
allowing a 40 per cent revaluation of balance 
sheet assets with the aim of reducing the tax 
liability of companies. 
New  credits  to  the  non-government  sector 
which rose by about 13.5 per cent in 1975, grew 
fairly slowly for an  era of high price inflation. 
Demand for  short-term bank credit by business 
enterprises was relatively slack last year, but 
there was  a tendency,  as  interest rates  de-
clined, for some conversion of  short-term credit 
into longer-term loans. The loan/deposit ratio 
of  the commercial banks declined from around 
65 per cent at mid-1974 to just above 60 per 
cent during the same period last year and re-
mained around this level until the year-end. In 
contrast institutions specialising in longer-term 
lending experienced a relatively strong demand 
for  credit,  indicative  of  preparation  by  the 
business sector of plans for expanding pro-
ductive capacity in the upswing ofthe business 
cycle. 
In  line  with  developments  elsewhere  in  the 
Community, a very substantial  expansion  in 
personal savings took place in the United King-
dom, amounting to a rise of some 24 per cent 
in  1975, which may have  been due either to 
precautionary savings at a time of economic 
uncertainty, or to the desire to counteract the 
loss in  the real  value of liquid assets due to 
inflation. The clearing banks reduced their rates 
on time-deposits under£ 10000 by about 2.5 
per cent during the course of 1975 while the 
building societies lowered their deposit rates 
by only 0.5 per cent during the same period. 
In consequence, liquid personal savings were channelled mainly into building society shares 
and deposits, with the amount of new holdings 
more than doubling compared with 1974. Place-
ments with other non-bank intermediaries, in-
cluding  insurance  companies  and  pension 
funds, also increased considerably.ln contrast 
the flow into time-deposits with banks dwindled 
to a trickle compared with the previous year. 
The slow growth of  bank deposits and the sales 
of  central government debt  direct  to the general 
public were factors in the quite modest increase 
in the money stock (M 3) last year of only 8 per 
cent, which was well  below the rate of price 
inflation. 
Undistributed  profits  (including  depreciation 
provisions and stock  appreciation) of  industrial 
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and commercial companies declined by about 
two  per cent in  1975  but those of financial 
companies experienced a rise in the region of 
40 per cent. The fall in profits of industrial and 
commercial companies resulted in  part from 
the decline in output and the tight market con-
ditions prevailing last year, and in part from the 
controls on prices and margins which prevented 
an  expansion of profitability where this might 
otherwise have been possible. Nevertheless, 
the financial position of  companies came much 
closer to balance and contrasted with the very 
heavy financial deficit existing in 1974. While 
retained profits of industrial and commercial 
companies were lower, the disposal of stocks 
and the slower growth in fixed capital expend-
itures  (even  at current prices)  reduced  the 
Table 7 -Share Issues by country 
(milliard units of account) 
Country  1972  1973  1974  1975 
Germany  1.18  1.08  1.17  1.98 
Credit institutions  0.39  0.33  0.32  0.60 
Enterprises  0.79  0.75  0.85  1.38 
France  1.67  1.88  1.92  1.79 
Credit institutions  0.38  0.44  0.34  0.25 
Enterprises  1.29  1.44  1.58  1.54 
United Kingdom  1.66  0.32  0.25  2.36 
Credit institutions  0.94  0.08  0.15  0.57 
Enterprises  0.72  0.24  0.10  1.79 
Italy  1.96  2.80  0.95  1.70 
Credit institutions  0.12  0.21  0.07  0.01 
Enterprises  1.84  2.59  0.88  1.69 
Netherlands  0.02  0.05  0.03  0.15 
Credit institutions  - 0.03  - 0.07 
Enterprises  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.08 
Belgium  0.37  0.34  0.42  0.38 
Credit institutions  0.04  0.07  0.05  0.06 
Enterprises  0.33  0.27  0.37  0.32 
Denmark  0.05  0.10  0.05  0.03 
Credit institutions  0.02  0.04  0.02  0.02 
Enterprises  0.03  0.06  0.03  0.01 
Ireland  0.04  0.03  - 0.01 
Credit institutions  0.01  - - -
Enterprises  0.03  0.03  - 0.01 
Luxembourg  - 0.02  0.05  0.00 
Credit institutions  - 0.02  0.05  0.00 
Enterprises  - 0.00  0.00  -
Total Community  6.95  6.62  4.84  8.40 
of which: 
Credit institutions  1.90  1.22  1.00  1.58 
Enterprises  5.05  5.40  3.84  6.82 28 
financial deficit in 1975. A contributing factor 
to this improvement may have been a limited 
relaxation of price controls and the easing of 
tax regulations with respect to profit on stock 
appreciation. 
New issues on  the U.K.  bond market by the 
public authorities increased very considerably 
in  1975 as a counterpart of the growth in the 
public  sector  borrowing  requirement.  New 
bond  issues  by the  Central  Government at 
£  5.2  milliard  were  almost  eight  times  the 
amount placed in the previous year, with most 
of  the issues being concentrated in the first and 
fourth  quarters  of 1975  when  the  market's 
absorptive capacity was at its best. Most of these 
issues were taken up by the non-bank sector. 
The amount of private sector bond issues was 
relatively small last year compared with the up-
surge in new equity funding which raised a total 
of over £  1300 million, almost ten times the 
amount in  1974.  Prices on  the stock market 
improved dramatically in  the first quarter of 
1975 and  companies took advantage of the 
improved tone of the market to bring forward, 
from March onwards, a steady stream of new 
equity issues,  many of them  in  the form  of 
rights  issues,  thus  helping  to  offset the  de-
terioration in financial structures that had oc-
curred over the past two years. 
As  against  the  expansion  of issues  on  the 
capital market, new bank lending was distinctly 
subdued last year. New credits made available 
to industrial and  commercial companies de-
clined by 84 per cent in 1975 and, taking into 
account their increased holdings of bank de-
posits,  non-financial  companies  were  net 
suppliers of  funds to the banking system fort  he 
first time in four years. The moderate upturn 
in  the housing market raised the demand for 
new mortgage loans which increased by about 
70 per cent last year, despite the continuance 
of relatively high interest rates on mortgages 
throughout 1975. 
Enterprises  were  not  short  of  finance  in 
Germany even though the public authorities 
tended to dominate the bond market as in the 
United Kingdom. The gross income of  business 
continued to rise in 1975 while profit margins 
tended  to  stabilise.  Expenditure  on  inputs 
appeared to decline to the same extent  as sales 
- in  part because of short-time working and 
the reduction in the numbers of employees-
while the cost of units of output benefited from 
the more modest rise in wages and salaries per 
person employed which at 7.0  per cent was 
lower than the 11.4 per cent recorded in 197  4. 
Partly because demand was  depressed and 
competition keen,  the cost of living index in 
December 1975 was only 5.4 per cent higher 
than twelve months earlier.ln the fourth quarter 
of the year there was a considerable improve-
ment in the tone of the domestic market with 
the sales, earnings and profit margins of enter-
prises recovering partially from the low points 
reached earlier in the year. 
For 1975 as a whole internally-generated funds 
in  the business  sector, excluding residential 
construction  firms  and  financial  institutions, 
which were available for financing investment, 
rose by  11.0  per cent. Businesses' capital in-
vestments, however, were lower last year than 
in 1974, even at current prices, so that the ratio 
of  capital  expenditure  requirements  which 
were  financed  from  internal  sources  rose 
appreciably to 92.2 per cent in 1975 compared 
with 79.6 per cent in  the previous year. This 
indicates the extent to which enterprises were 
able to temper their demands on capital markets 
during  the  year.  While  financial  enterprises 
took advantage of more buoyant market con-
ditions  in  raising  88.4  per cent more capital 
through new share issues than in  197  4,  non-
financial  enterprises  did  almost  as  well  in 
achieving  a 51.3  per cent increase. As  with 
United Kingdom enterprises, these additions of 
share capital would have helped to strengthen 
balance sheets after  the stagnation of  the share 
market in 197  4. Enterprises in the private sector 
were able to continue with their net redemp-
tions of bond issues during 1975, while enter-
prises in  the public sector, taken as a group, 
also achieved a net reduction in their bonded 
debt.  After  the  heavy  resort  to  short-term borrowing from financial  institutions in  1974, 
enterprises as a whole tended during 1975 to 
replace short-term by longer-term credit. In the 
fourth  quarter,  however,  enterprises  were 
borrowing heavily at short as well as at longer-
term in financing higher turnover and the re-
building of stocks. 
The banking system was well placed to increase 
its lending to the domestic private sector in the 
form of medium and long-term credits which 
rose by 8.8 per cent in  1975, all of this in the 
second  half  of the  year.  Public  enterprises 
borrowed from the banking system throughout 
the year but much more heavily in the second · 
half when they had to forego making new issues. 
At  a  time  of greater  uncertainty  as  to  the 
economic future and an extension of  short-time 
working,  it  seems  that  private  households 
tended  to  defer spending  on  less  essential 
items and to increase their savings. This was 
particularly evident in the first half of the year 
when the ratio of  savings to personal disposable 
income rose to 16.8  per cent compared with 
14.4 per cent in the comparable 197  4 period. 
The losses on personal incomes through short-
time working or unemployment were offset in 
aggregate  by  tax  reliefs  and  by  the  social 
assistance  programmes  of the Government 
which were greatly expanded last year.  The 
supply of funds to the financial intermediaries 
through  new  time and  savings  deposits  in-
creased by 59 per cent in 197  5.1 n  addition sums 
raised by financial institutions in the form oftap 
issues  of securities  placed  directly with  in-
vestors amounted to DM  35.6 milliard in 1975 
compared with DM 21 milliard in 1974and DM 23 
milliard in 1973. It seems that a substantial part 
of private saving took the form of purchases of 
these securities. In spite of  the abundant liquidity 
of the financial system new mortgage credits 
for residential construction declined in  1975 
because of  the depressed demand for housing. 
The growing volume of saving in Germany, by 
adding to the liquidity of financial institutions 
and enabling them to increase their security 
purchases, helped to strengthen the bond mar-
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ket. Towards the middle of the year, however, 
the bond market showed signs of strain. As a 
result of the protective steps taken by the au-
thorities and described in the first sub-section 
of this  chapter,  the average yield  on  bonds 
issued by public sector borrowers, which had 
stood at 9.8 per cent at the beginning of the 
year and had fallen to 8.2 per cent by the end of 
June, only rose to 8.4 per cent at its highest 
during October/November, before falling back 
to 8.3 per cent at the end of 1975. 
In spite of the closure of the bond market for 
almost half the year to public sector borrowers, 
new bond issues accounted for a net DM  49 
milliard  of new finance  in  1975  as  a whole, 
approximately double the amount in the pre-
vious year. The public authorities in fact raised 
over a net DM 9 milliard in 1975. To this amount 
should be added DM  11.5 milliard obtained by 
the Federal Government against the issue of 
discountable Treasury bonds and Federal sav-
ings bonds in  the course of financing its ex-
ceptionally large deficit and a further DM  0.5 
milliard against the issue of similar bonds by 
the Lander. 
The benefit of the revival of the bond market 
in France was more evenly distributed between 
public and  private sector borrowers than  in 
other countries.  Contributing  to  this  revival, 
new saving in the form of term and savings de-
posits with  banks and deposits with savings 
banks together with Treasury bonds rose sharp-
ly by 38 per cent in 1975 or at double the rate 
of the  previous  year.  Uncertainty  regarding 
employment suggests that there was a large 
precautionary element in such saving as well as 
an  adjustment of holdings of relatively liquid 
assets to rising  incomes and  prices. The  re-
duced profitability of enterprises, on the other 
hand,  seriously  impaired  their  capacity  to 
finance investment from their own resources. 
Investment by enterprises probably rose  by 
about 4 per  cent in value in 1975 while declining 
sharply in volume. Even this modest increase 
in  value  terms  resulted  in  a fall  in  the self-
financing  ratio to about 47  per cent in  1975 %
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 from 64 per cent in the previous year and thus 
resulted in a massive increase in indebtedness. 
The marked improvement in the flow of saving 
into the bond market in 1975 was influenced by 
a decline in short-term interest rates on the one 
hand and by a reducing rate of inflation on the 
other and enabled enterprises to cover a large 
part of their financial requirements. As far as 
enterprises  in  the  private  sector were  con-
cerned offering yields on new bond issues with-
out government guarantee fell from about11.90 
per cent at the end of 197  4 to about 10.63 per 
cent  in  September 1975,  though  they  rose 
again to 10.90 per cent in the last two months 
of the year as issuing activity accelerated. Net 
new bond issues by  non-financial private enter-
prises roseby168percentfrom F.fr. 3.7 milliard 
in 1974 to F.fr. 9.9 milliard in 1975. In the same 
period issues by public enterprises (Eiectricite 
de France, Air France, Pastes Telegraphes et 
Telecommunications, the railways etc. but ex-
cluding  financial  intermediaries)  rose  even 
more sharply from F.fr. 1.9 milliard to F.fr. 7.2 
milliard or by 279 per cent, while bond issues 
by banks and specialised long-term credit in-
stitutions (but excluding Societies for Regional 
Development)  approximately  doubled,  from 
F.fr. 8.6 milliard to F.fr.16.1 milliard. Rising share 
prices were a misleading indicator of the state 
of the share market which was relatively de-
pressed and new issues fell to F.fr. 9.6 milliard 
in 1975 from 10.7 milliard in the previous year, 
reflecting the uncertainty of the economic out-
look for most of the year. 
In these circumstances resort to bank credit 
was relatively modest. The total of new credit 
advanced by financial institutions rose by only 
3.3 per cent in 1975 compared with a little over 
10 per cent a year earlier. Within the total, the 
proportion of  new short-term credit fell to about 
Chart IV -The provision of capital 
for the non-government sector 
from domestic and International sources 
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25 per cent in 1975 as against a relatively high 
37 per cent  in 197  4 as a result of  reduced activity 
and  the  liquidation  of  stocks.  The  banking 
system was thus able to satisfy the demand for 
credit while remaining well within the permitted 
credit ceilings. 
As  in  France a high volume of saving in Den-
mark aided the recovery of the bond market to 
the benefit of the private as well as the public 
sector. Following the reduction in early 1975 of 
personal income taxes, much of the increase 
in  personal disposable incomes was, for pre-
cautionary reasons, retained by individuals in 
the form of  savings. Savings in the form of new 
time deposits with the banking system rose by 
12.3  per  cent  last  year,  and  relatively  few 
account-holders took  advantage of  the release 
Table 8-Net domestic public issues of bonds in the Community 
(milliard units of account) 
Country (1)  1972  1973  1974  1975 
Germany  9.26  8.37  8.26  14.43 
Public authorities  0.62  1.13  0.68  2.98 
Credit institutions  7.67  6.85  6.96  11.72 
Enterprises  0.97  0.39  0.62  -0.27 
France  3.31  4.97  2.52  6.33 
Public authorities  0.47  1.25  -0.03  0.16 
Credit institutions  1.53  2.33  1.54  2.99 
Enterprises  1.31  1.39  1.01  3.18 
United Kingdom  -0.33  3.23  1.24  9.84 
Public authorities  -1.09  3.12  1.29  9.68 
Credit institutions  0.21  0.05  0.08  0.11 
Enterprises  0.55  0.06  -0.13  0.05 
Italy  9.29  14.51  4.26  14.94 
Public authorities  4.21  4.47  1.50  6.26 
Credit institutions  3.88  8.88  2.64  6.96 
Enterprises  1.20  1.16  0.12  1.72 
Netherlands  0.77  0.50  0.85  1.47 
Public authorities  0.28  0.12  0.29  0.64 
Credit institutions  0.17  0.31  0.41  0.64 
Enterprises  0.32  0.07  0.15  0.19 
Belgium  2.76  2.88  2.95  3.73 
Public authorities  2.07  2.03  1.62  2.65 
Credit institutions  0.44  0.64  1.08  0.87 
Enterprises  0.25  0.21  0.25  0.21 
Denmark  1.71  2.18  2.27  3.85 
Public authorities  -0.01  0.05  0.01  0.83 
Credit institutions  1.72  2.12  2.25  3.00 
Enterprises  -0.00  0.01  0.01  0.02 
Ireland  0.24  0.22  0.25  0.74 
Public authorities  0.24  0.22  0.23  0.72 
Credit institutions  - - 0.02  0.02 
Enterprises  0.00  - - -
Luxembourg  0.01  0.01  -0.01  0.04 
Public authorities  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  -0.01 
Credit institutions  -0.00  0.01  -0.00  0.01 
Enterprises  0.01  0.01  -0.00  0.04 
Total Community  27.02  36.87  22.59  55.37 
Public authorities  6.79  12.38  5.58  23.91 
Credit institutions  15.62  21.19  14.98  26.32 
Enterprises  4.61  3.30  2.03  5.14 
(1)  The issues entered under "Public authorities" include all issues by the government and public institutions, 
although the proceeds of these issues may sometimes make it possible to grant loans to enterprises. of funds to individuals in September from the 
obligatory savings scheme initiated in 1974 to 
withdraw  funds  from  these  special  savings 
deposits.  Corporate  profits,  however,  were 
under  considerable  pressure  from  reduced 
sales, increased competition (especially in ex-
port markets) and the freezing of gross profit 
margins imposed by the authorities in March. 
These factors, and the rise in labour costs per 
unit of output which was itself lower in volume, 
narrowed the scope for enterprises to maintain 
net income at the previous year's level. 
Net new  issues  of bonds  by private sector 
borrowers which rose by 36 per cent in 1975, 
reflected the improved issue conditions pre-
vailing  on  the  market.  As  discussed  earlier 
there was  a ready supply of funds available 
from the banks which took up 55 per cent of 
the new bonds issued on the market last year 
(both private and public sector bonds), com-
pared with only 1  0 per cent of new issues in 
1974.  The  very  large  government financing 
operation in the third quarter, which comprised 
three  D.Kr.  2  milliard  tranches  of short-to-
medium  dated  stocks,  was  the first  sizable 
approach to the domestic bond market by the 
Government for more than 15 years. This issue 
tightened  market  conditions,  and  yields  on 
special mortgage bonds which had declined 
from  about 15.5  per cent at end-December 
1974 to  13.1  per cent in  June subsequently 
stabilised at around this rate until mid-October. 
A modification of the supply/demand relation-
ship for funds on the bond market occurred in 
the final quarter of the year and yields rose to 
around 14  per cent,  despite supporting  pur-
chases of securities by the monetary author-
ities. This deterioration prompted the central 
bank  and  the  mortgage  credit  institutes  to 
reach an agreement as to market regulation, in 
the context of which the institutes stipulated 
that their issues in 1976 would be limited to a 
total somewhat lower than last year. The small 
market for equity funds suffered a 35 per cent 
reduction in new issue activity, as non-financial 
enterprises  in  particular  were  less  able  to 
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convince investors on the prospects for  growth 
in corporate earnings. 
The easing of the credit ceiling in successive 
steps during the course of 1975 resulted in a 
four-fold expansion of new loan commitments 
by the banks compared with the previous year. 
However, the proportion of  these "loan commit-
ments" in fact drawn was sharply reduced by 
59 per cent in 1975 with the slowing of  business 
and  investment  activity.  Loans  for  new  re-
sidential  and  non-residential  construction 
were  particularly  affected.  The  demand  for 
bank credit seemed to be little affected either 
by reductions in interest rates payable on loans, 
or by the regulation  by the authorities from 
March onwards of  the margin between deposit 
and loan rates. 
The  bond  market  in  Belgium  strengthened 
during 1975 as in other Member States, bene-
fiting from a high volume of personal saving 
but the financial position of enterprises seems 
to have suffered more than in most  other coun-
tries.  Gross  financial  savings  by companies 
and  individuals  combined  was  estimated  to 
have increased by 14 per cent in  1975. Pre-
cautionary saving by individuals faced with the 
economic  recession  increased  substantially 
last year as indicated by the increase of about 
40 per cent in new deposits with the financial 
system  by  individuals  and  enterprises.  Cor-
porate saving, on the other hand, appears not 
to have increased at  all as a result of  constraints 
on  profit margins. It has  been estimated that 
labour costs (wages  plus social security ex-
penses)  per unit of production increased by 
nearly 30 per cent in the twelve months to the 
March-May period of 1975. The sharpness of 
this increase was due principally to the lowered 
industrial output  which had to support increased 
wage costs and higher social security expenses 
payable  by employers  (since  the ceiling  on 
certain of these expenses had been removed 
last year) at a time of reduced productivity per 
employee. Prices could not be raised sufficient-
ly to match cost increases, either because of 
competitive influences in  a declining market 
or because of government price controls, and 34 
profit margins took the impact. Towards the 
end of 1975 the rise in wage costs slowed, but 
industrial output continued to be depressed. 
In spite of  the liquidity of  capital markets during 
1975 net new bond issues by enterprises con-
tracted by nearly 19 per cent. Companies in the 
energy  sector,  however,  were  prominent  in 
tapping the market. The generally diminished 
activity in  the private sector was  more than 
counterbalanced by a rise of  nearly 64 per cent 
in new bond issues on behalf of public sector 
borrowers which helped towards covering the 
increased deficit of  the public sector  as a whole. 
Share prices rose until April/May of last year 
but then  faltered  as  the seriousness  of the 
economic  recession  became  more  evident. 
They  nevertheless stood  about 16 per cent 
higher at the end of the year than at the be-
ginning. The value of new share issues declined 
by roughly 10 per cent last year or slightly more 
than they did under similar circumstances in 
France. 
It appears that less was available to enterprises 
from internal sources and less from new issues 
to finance a slightly larger amount of capital 
expenditure during 1975 than in the previous 
year.  The  remaining  solution seems to have 
been  recourse to the banking  system.  New 
credit made available to the non-government 
sector  by  Belgian  financial  intermediaries 
accordingly increased substantially in  1975, 
rising by about 72 per cent over the previous 
year. This compares with a decline of 19 per 
cent in  197  4. The circumstances of this rapid 
expansion in the availability of credit were the 
relaxation of monetary policy in general and, 
more particularly, the easing of the tight credit 
ceilings  that  had  existed  in  197  4.  The  con-
sequent general lowering of interest costs on 
loans would have helped borrowers. 
As  economic activity in the Netherlands was 
less  severely  cut back  during  1975 than  in 
many  other  countries,  the  changes  in  the 
sources and application of finance tended to 
be  less  marked and  may in  some instances 
have been in the opposite direction to those 
occurring elsewhere. The saving of the private 
sector, for example, instead of increasing, de-
clined as a proportion of net national income 
from 13.6 per cent in 197  4 to 12.4 per cent last 
year. This was reflected in a reduction of 24 per 
cent in the total of new savings and time de-
posits during 1975. Company savings are in-
cluded in the above statistics along with those 
Table 9- Short, medium and long-term credits to the non-government sector 
(Variation in amounts outstanding at year's end) 
(milliard units of account) 
of which: 
Country  1972  1973  1974  1975 
funds raised through security 
issues by credit institutions 
1972  1973  1974  1975 
Germany  28.87  26.36  22.18  16.31  8.06  7.18  7.28  12.32 
France  19.49  19.70  21.57  23.16  1.91  2.77  1.88  3.24 
United Kingdom  20.40  20.43  14.10  6.52  1.15  0.13  0.23  0.68 
Italy  12.71  17.22  13.13  15.01  4.00  9.09  2.71  6.97 
Netherlands  4.83  6.66  7.92  7.67  0.17  0.34  0.41  0.71 
Belgium  2.34  2.87  2.99  3.69  0.48  0.71  1.13  0.93 
Denmark  2.74  3.44  3.03  3.41  1.74  2.16  2.27  3.02 
Ireland  0.65  0.56  0.42  0.52  0.01  - 0.02  0.02 
Luxembourg  -{a)  0.17  0.28  0.24  -0.00  0.03  0.05  0.01 
Total Community  92.03  97.41  85.62  76.53  17.52  22.41  15.98  27.90 
(a) Estimates are incomplete of individuals and would have accounted for 
part of  the deterioration. However  for  the enter-
prise sector as a whole th~  decline during 1975 
in the proportion of interest and profits per unit 
of sales seems to have been slightly less than 
in  1974,  except  in  manufacturing  industry 
where the fall between 1974 and 1975 was of 
the order of46  per cent. The pressure on profit 
margins seems mostly to have been rather less 
last year when the rise in wage rates and earn-
ings moderated and some raw material prices 
fell, combining to offset the adverse effect to 
reduced output on productivity. Individuals on 
the other hand may have felt less need to save 
in 1975 because the future seemed more se-
cure. While the private sector's saving declined, 
its expenditure on fixed investment fell even 
faster,  leaving  scope for an  increased  con-
tribution through the mechanism of the capital 
market towards financing the public sector's 
deficit. 
As indicated in an earlier section the bond mar-
ket improved steadily until mid-year under the 
favourable  influence of declining  short-term 
interest  rates.  Yields  on  long-term  bonds 
issued  by  public  sector borrowers  declined 
from 9.3 per cent in December 1974 to 7.9 per 
cent in  June of last year;  a sharp  upwards 
adjustment in July was partially compensated 
by some decline in subsequent months and the 
bond market ended the year on a favourable 
note. Owing to the slack demand for credit and 
theconsequentliquidityofthefinancialsystem, 
there  was  an  abundant supply of funds  for 
taking up new bond issues. 
The larger budget deficit incurred by the central 
government last year was reflected in a total of 
Fl. 1  934 million of new bond issues by the State 
compared with only Fl. 471 million in 1974. The 
total of bond issues by the enterprise sector 
rose by 27 per cent in 1975, with the major part 
of this  increase coming from the substantial 
expansion  in  issues  by the mortgage banks. 
Public  and  non-financial  private  enterprises 
also  raised  much  more through  new place-
ments last year. On the share market prices 
rose by nearly 29 per cent during the year with 
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most of the improvement coming in the first 
half and in December. In the more favourable 
climate the amount of new share issues  in-
creased  six-fold  in  1975 compared with the 
previous  year,  but  they  still  formed  only  a 
modest proportion  of total  financing.  A sig-
nificant factor last  year  was  that banks  felt 
impelled to seek an improvement in their capital 
structures by  increasing their issues of sub-
ordinated bonds to Fl.  627 million from Fl.  58 
million in 1974 but they also made substantial 
new  equity  issues  while  market  conditions 
were favourable.  Thus  new share  issues  by 
financial institutions totalled Fl.  219 million in 
1975 compared with none in the previous year. 
In  recognition of the difficulties which enter-
prises in gen-eral were having in raising equity 
capital,  the  Nationale  lnvesteringsbank  was 
authorised to issue up to Fl. 500 million of "sub-
ordinated loans" which would be regarded as 
companies'  "own  funds"  for  balance  sheet 
purposes until they could be replaced by new 
issues of equity. By the end of1975onlyasmall 
proportion of  the total available had been com-
mitted. 
The low profile of business conditions was re-
flected in the decline of about 40 per cent in 
new credit made available to the economy. The 
poor performance was due more to the lack of 
demand  for  investment  funds  than  to  any 
shortage in the potential supply. Nevertheless, 
as  business prospects improved towards the 
end  of 1975 there was  some resurgence  of 
demand for loans in the fourth quarter, possibly 
in  connection  with  the  rebuilding  of stocks. 
Issues of debt certificates (onderhandse lenin-
gen) by enterprises to financial institutions are 
included in  the total of new credit, as  these 
issues being in the nature of  private placings do 
not figure among  public bond  issues.  While 
other forms of credit contracted, issues of  debt 
certificates rose,  reflecting the preference of 
enterprises for increasing their funded debt to 
extending their short-term loan commitments. 
In Ireland many of the financing patterns in the 
larger  Member States  were  repeated  on  a 
smaller scale; personal saving was high and the % 
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Chart V - Short and long-term interest rates 
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(2)  The  gross yields for bonds are those of bonds 
quoted on stock exchanges in the differentfinan-
cial markets in the Community, the characteristics 
of which at issue come closest to those of the 
European Investment Bank's bonds. 
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bond market revived but was tapped mainly by 
the public authorities.  Rising  unemployment 
and the uncertainty of  the economic outlook in 
1975  appear  to  have  led  to  an  increase  in 
personal saving as a precautionary measure. 
Money incomes were also rising but not  as fast 
as personal saving which was of  the order of 50 
per cent up on the previous year. Incomes in 
the  agricultural  sector  probably  increased 
more than those of  other sectors and, as farmers 
normally have a higher propensity to save than 
others,  they  probably saved  more.  A  minor 
additional  stimulus  may  have  been  derived 
from  the  introduction  of  two  government 
savings bond schemes in October in which the 
real value of the capital invested is preserved 
by adjusting amounts repayable according to 
changes in the consumer price index. 
In contrast, the real value of company profits 
declined. Costs of production rose more than 
prices of final  output and as  a result the in-
crease in the value of company profits of the 
order of 10 per cent was lower than the rate of 
inflation. Consequently, the capacity of enter-
prises to finance investment from internal re-
sources was reduced. 
The necessity of  financing the very large public 
sector borrowing requirement of some £ 675 
million or so in 1975 resulted in an exceptionally 
large increase in  the amount of new govern-
ment bond issues brought on the market. Gross 
new issues by the State totalled£ 410 million 
last year compared with only £ 138 million in 
1974. The supply of funds from the non-bank 
public was  unexpectedly large in  that a net 
£ 190 million of new State issues was taken up 
compared with only£ 30 million in the previous 
year. New bond and equity issues by the enter-
prise sector  also increased appreciably in 1975, 
to  £  18  million,  although  financing  from  the 
capital  markets  in  Ireland  is  relatively small 
compared with  the amount of credits made 
available from the banking system. 
In  spite  of the  efforts  of the  authorities  to 
stimulate  activity  in  the  manufacturing  and 
construction  industries,  demand  for  credit 
remained  depressed.  Bank  lending  to  the 
personal sector, on the other hand, was buoyant 
during the year. As indicated in the June 1975 
budget, the Central Bank of Ireland reached 
an agreement with the Associated Banks under 
which the latter would provide£ 40 million over 
two  years  for  house  purchases.  Under this 
scheme the banks approved loans to the value 
of£ 12.5 million during the second half of  1975. 
During  the  year as  a  whole  mortgages ad-
vanced  by the  Building  Societies  increased 
substantially, and the increase in interest rates, 
as from 18 November for new borrowers, on 
Building  Society  mortgages  from  11.50  per 
cent to 12.50 per cent had no significant impact 
during the remainder of 1975. 
The fall in  personal and corporate savings in 
Luxembourg as represented by new time and 
savings deposits which fell by 90 per cent last 
year as  com pared with  197  4 contrasted the 
pattern in  many other Community countries. 
Business profits were inevitably reduced by  the 
lower sales volume and by the narrower profit 
margins induced by increased competition and 
lower productivity. Insofar as the steel sector 
was concerned, this deterioration extended to 
all  firms.  In  contrast,  banking  institutions 
situated in Luxembourg generally experienced 
a strong improvement in profits, not least as a 
result of increased activity on the eurobond 
market. 
Reduced  business activity and lower invest-
ment  demand contributed to a decline of 14 per 
cent in new credit made available to the non-
government sector. At the same time restric-
tions on the granting of consumer credit and, 
for  part  of  the  year,  mortgage  credit,  un-
doubtedly had an impact on loan growth. With 
respect  to  consumer  credit,  amounts  out-
standing were limited to an expansion of only 
5 per cent between October 197  4 and  end-
September of last year.  The  progressive re-
moval of restrictions on mortgage credit, how-
ever,  led to some resurgence in  these loans 
granted during the course of 1975. 
A brisk expansion in the number of new issues 
floated on the bond market last year was large-ly attributable to demand by domestic private 
sector borrowers who raised Flux 2.2 milliard 
in  1975, following a net redemption of bonds 
in the previous year. The upsurge of new bond 
issues was shared equally by financial and non-
financial enterprises. Public sector borrowers, 
however, continued the pattern of  recent years 
in that there was no recourse to the bond mar-
ket in  1975 but instead a net redemption of 
existing bonds. In January 1976, the Govern-
ment departed from this because of an anti-
cipated increase in  budgetary commitments 
and approached the bond market for a loan of 
Flux 1 milliard. 
2.3. DEBT ISSUES BY COMMUNITY 
BORROWERS ON THE SWISS 
AND U.S. MARKETS 
In 197  4 when the Swiss market was closed to 
foreign borrowers for  a number of  months, new 
public issues of bonds by Community borrowers 
contracted sharply.  The  market regained  its 
strength however in 1975 and issues by Com-
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munity borrowers leaped upwards by 136 per 
cent to almost S.fr.  1 milliard, thus improving 
ontheirtotalin 1973. The growth of  Community 
borrowing during 1975 was in line with that of 
the market as a whole and its proportion of the 
total of  S.fr. 2490 million of  approximately two-
fifths was, if anything, slightly less than in the 
previous year. 
The  remarkable  expansion of foreign  public 
issues in Switzerland reflects the efforts of the 
Swiss authorities to offset  capital inflows which 
were  tending  to  cause  the  currency to ap-
preciate in  value against a number of other 
major  currencies.  The  bi-monthly  quota  for 
foreign bond issues was raised progressively 
from S.fr.  230 million in January/February to 
about S.fr. 400 million in July/August where it 
remained for the rest of the year; the limit on 
individual issues was increased in March from 
S.fr.  60  million  to S.fr.  80  million.  Monetary 
policy was eased, as indicated by successive 
reductions in discount rate from 5.5 per cent 
at the  beginning  of 1975 to 3.0  per cent in 
October.  Interest  rates  in  Switzerland  re-
Table 10 -The  contribution of external capital flows to domestic financing (1), 1975 
Provisional estimates 
(+ inflow; - outflow) 
(million units of account) 
Germany  France  United  Italy 
Nether- Belgium/ 
Denmark  Ireland  Kingdom  lands  Luxembg. 
Private long-term capital: 
Net direct investment  - 543  +230  -290  +563  +  4  n.a. 
Net portfolio investment  - 121  -619 
including loans  -5300  -909  - 76  -706  +  35  n.a. 
Total private long-term 
capital flow  -5843  - 121  -619  -679  -366  -143  + 39  +  9 (2) 
Public sector long-term capital 
flow, including loans, total  +  371  - 139  -830  +306  - 81  -130  +124  +344 
Short-term capital flow, 
total (3)  +1603 +3442  +711  -315  -300  -118  +  30  n.a. 
Total Capital Account of Balance 
of International Payments (4)  -3869 +3182  -738  -688  -747  -391  +193  +353 
(1)  This table is based on national balance of payments data and national definitions, while similar, may 
differ slightly as between countries. In most cases public enterprises have been included in the public 
sectors. 
(2)  Includes short-term capital flow. 
(3)  Includes net external position of the private banking sector, except for Denmark. 
(4)  Unidentified flows have been excluded except for Ireland and Denmark 40 
mained lower than in all other major markets 
but, while this proved attractive to a number of 
borrowers,  the  obvious  exchange  risk  of a 
currency with a high potential for appreciation 
appeared to temper the enthusiasm of others. 
The other main market open to public issues, 
that of the United States,  subscribed during 
1975 to an even larger amount of public issues 
launched by residents in  the Community, in-
cluding the European Investment Bank and the 
European Coal and Steel Community. The total 
of issues by Community borrowers of$ 585 
million was equivalent to 469 million units of 
account whereas the equivalent of  Community 
borrowing in Swiss francs was 310 million units 
of account. 
Community issues  on  the American  market 
have thus grown rapidly since the suspension 
of  the interest equalisation tax at the beginning 
of 197  4,  a year in  which they amounted to a 
modest $ 100 million. They are still well below 
the annual volume of the dollar sector of the 
international capital  market in  Europe which 
appears  to  have  withstood  the competition 
that was threatened when the interest equal-
isation tax was  suspended  by the American 
authorities. 
Community borrowing on the Swiss and United 
States markets would normally be covered in 
the  statistics  of  international  capital  move-
ments assembled in Table 10 under net port-
folio investment. As it happens the net move-
ment of private long-term capital during 1975 
was mostly outward, whereas the public sector 
seems to have been more or less in balance. 
The more advantageous situation of  the public 
sector on a number of domestic bond markets 
was thus repeated in international transactions. 
It should be noted, however, that capital move-
ments within the Community are included in 
the figures of the Table. 41 
CHAPTER3 
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS 
3.1. PUBLIC BOND ISSUES ON THE 
EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL MARKET 
AND ISSUES BY NON-RESIDENTS ON 
NATIONAL MARKETS 
The fall in short-term interest rates on the inter-
national market in the latter part of 1974 which 
took them  to  below long-term yields set the 
scene for a strong revival of the bond market 
during 1975. The re-establishment of a normal 
relationship  between  short  and  long-term 
interest rates was clearly important in persuad-
ing investors resident in the petroleum-export-
ing countries as well as others to place some 
of their surplus financial resources at longer 
term. The participation of a growing number of 
Arab financial institutions in issuing syndicates 
was partly an effect and partly a cause of the 
attraction of Middle East funds into the bond 
market. The high liquidity of  international banks 
and redemptions of earlier euro-bond issues 
also helped to provide a receptive market for 
new issues. In addition bond dealers were en-
couraged  to  rebuild  their inventories  of se-
curities by the lower cost of  short-term finance. 
If the totals in Table 11  for issues managed by 
domestic syndicates are combined with those 
for issues managed by international syndicates, 
it will be seen that new issues increased more 
than four times in amount from an exceptional-
ly low 1307 million units of account in 197  4 to 
5348 million units of account in 1975. Virtually 
all sectors of the market shared in this marked 
expansion. Issues denominated in U.S. dollars, 
taking  straight  bonds  and  convertibles  to-
gether, more than trebled to 2157 million units 
of account but this was not nearly so sharp as 
the almost six-fold increase in Deutschemark 
denominated securities to 1667 million units of 
account. In the earlier part of 1975 Deutsche-
mark issues were leading U.S. dollar issues in 
volume but by lateJulytheGerman authorities 
suspended new issue activity and did not re-
open the primary market until the end of Octo-
ber. During this period investors were attracted 
to U.S. dollar issues by the appreciation of the 
currency after its  earlier  weakness  and  the 
market became very active. Canadian dollar 
issues, in which the borrowers were all Cana-
dian residents, also attracted investors by the 
prospect  of  appreciation  of  the  currency. 
Issues  denominated  in  Belgian  and  Luxem-
bourg  francs  rose  more or less  in  line  with 
others and the sectors denominated in French 
francs and Dutch guilders reopened for new 
issues during the course of 1975, the former 
receiving a stimulus from the re-entry in July 
of the franc into the European currency snake. 
The story of units of account on the other hand 
was  chequered;  issues  denominated  in  the 
now classic European unit of account (not the 
basket of currencies)  rose satisfactorily and 
the European currency unit was revived for a 
single issue but the EURCO remained unused. 
Three issues were denominated in SDR but the 
rise  in  the exchange value of the U.S.  dollar 
against  this  unit  discouraged  any  further 
attempts to use it. 
The  improvement in  the international capital 
market during  1975 was not confined to the 
total of new issues. Yields fell in most sectors 
both on  primary and secondary markets. 0 n 
U.S.  dollar securities the decline was  of the 
order of one percentage point while on Deut-
schemark securities it was nearly double this. 
A further indication of the returning health of 
the  market was  the  gradual  lengthening  of 
maturities  on  new issues  after being  cut to 
around five years in the difficulties experienced 
in  1974.  By the end of 1975 ten  year issues 
denominated  in  U.S.  dollars  were  not  un-
common. But for the temporary closing of the 
Deutschemark sector a similar trend seemed 
to be developing in issues in that currency; as 42 
Table 11  -Public issues of bonds on the "European" international market 
(million units of account) 
Domestic Syndicates  International Syndicates 
1974  1975  1974  1975 
Convertible bonds  - - 68  100 
U.S. dollars  - - 68  100 
Bonds with warrants  - - 20  -
U.S. dollars  - - 20  -
Straight bonds  90  626  1129  4622 
U.S. dollars  - - 635  2057 
Canadian dollars  - - 46  409 
Deutschemarks  50  346  195  1 321 
French francs  - 28  - 205 
Dutch guilders  - 131  - -
Belgian francs  16  66  - -
Luxembourg francs  24  55  - -
Norwegian Kroner/OM option  - - - 34 
Austrian schillings  - - 13  -
Kuwaiti dinars  - - 41  135 
European units of account  - - 139  292 
European composite units 
(EURCO)  - - 60  -
Special drawing rights 
(SDR)  - - - 137 
European currency units (Ill)  - - - 32 
Total Issues of Bonds  90  626  1 217  4722 
Borrowers in Europe (1)  90  461  738  2649 
Within the Community  74  401  520  1461 
- European Investment Bank  9  219  112  168 
- Commission of the 
European Communities 
(on behalf of E.C.S.C.)  58  112  56  87 
- Other Community 
borrowers  7  70  352  1206 
Outside the Community  16  60  218  1188 
Borrowers on the 
American Continent  - - 166  851 
U.S.A  - - 76  167 
Others  - - 90  684 
Japanese borrowers  - - 114  615 
Miscellaneous  - 165  199  607 
(1)  The  geographical classification of borrowers has  been based upon the nationality - and hence the 
the location of the registered office - of the issuers except for holding companies which are affiliates 
of foreign companies; these holding companies have been classified according to the nationality of 
their parent companies. 
things were, the stretching of maturities reached 
eight years. It was however possible to raise 
longer term money in European units of  account. 
Before  proceeding  to  examine  the  uses  to 
which  funds  borrowed  on  the  international 
capital market were put, it should be explained 
that the statistics cover public issues of: 
- bonds issued in one or more countries by 
non-residents,  but which  are  not denom-
inated in the currency  of  the country of  issue; 
- bonds which, although issued by residents of 
a specific country in their own currency, are 
expressly reserved for subscription by non-
residents; - bonds  which,  although  issued  in  a specific 
country by non-residents and denominated in 
that country's currency, are placed in several 
countries by the issuing syndicates in so far 
as the syndicates include foreign banks; 
- bonds to which special monetary clauses are 
attached (units of  account, EURCO, ECU, SDR 
and other multiple currency issues). 
Turning now  to the destination of  the funds raised 
on the international market, borrowers within the 
Community took 1  862 million units of account 
in 1975 or 35 per cent of the total as against 45 
per cent of a much smaller amount in  1974. 
Borrowers in Europe outside the Community, for 
example in Norway, were again active but those 
in the U.S.A., now relieved by the withdrawal of 
official guidelines of the need to raise funds ex-
ternally for  their  overseas investments, remained 
relatively  quiet.  Borrowers  on  the  American 
continent other than in the U.S.A. increased their 
offtake of  funds substantially, much of  this being 
the borrowing of Canadian dollars by Canadian 
residents. Last but not least Japanese borrowers 
secured a larger share (15 per cent in 1975 as 
against nearly 9 per centthe previous year) of  the 
available resources of  the market. 
The  uses  to  which  loan  proceeds  were  put 
changed considerably between 197  4 and 1975. 
Bearing in  mind that the 1975 total was about 
four times as large as that for 197  4, the share 
obtained  by international  institutions fell  from 
13.8 per cent to 5. 7 per cent and that of  transport 
and communications from 16.5 per cent to 10.2 
43 
per cent. In contrast  to what happened on-several 
national  capital  markets,  the  proportion Yof 
borrowing by public authorities also fell,  de-
clining from 25.4 per cent to 20.1  per cent. The 
sectors showing the largest increases in mar-
ket shares, again in contrast to the out-turn on 
several domestic markets, were manufacturing 
industry (up from  16.0 per cent to 24.9 per 
cent), energy and mining (from 9.7 per cent to 
15.8 per cent) and financial institutions (from 
15.0 per cent to 21.4 per cent). The differences 
between this allocation of resources and that 
on most national markets may be explained 
partly by the preference of some national au-
thorities to borrow mostly on their domestic 
markets where this aids control over the finan-
cial system and partly by  the greater economic 
strength in times of recession of the industrial 
borrowers who normally seek finance on the 
international market. 
Statistics of privately placed bond issues are 
naturally more difficult to obtain than those of 
public issues. The OECD, however, has been 
publishing a compilation of  private international 
placings (as has the World Bank) which is re-
produced in  summary form in  Table  13. The 
increase in private placings in 1975 over those 
in 197  4 was not nearly so marked as in public 
issues.  In  1974 private placings substantially 
exceeded public issues,  mainly because the 
surplus funds of  petroleum exporting countries 
were  being  sought through  private arrange-
ments while difficulties were being experienced 
on  the normal primary market. As  explained 
Table 12 -Total resources raised by Community borrowers through public issues 
on the financial markets 
(milliard units of account) 
1974  1~75 
- Net issues on the national markets 
of member countries  27.43  63.77 
- Issues on the European 
international market (1)  0.52  1.46 
- Issues on other national markets  0.21  0.78 
Total Community  28.16  66.01 
(1)  As the volume of redemptions effected on Eurobonds in circulation cannot be assessed accurately, 
the figures given here relate to gross amounts raised. 44 
Table 13-Private placings of bonds on the international market {1) 
(million units of account) 
Currency of issue  1974  1975 
DM  281.7  774.8 
Fl  305.0  526.8 
U.S.$  1 753.8  1 367.1 
Other  15.0  124.4 
Total  2355.5  2 793.1 
Issuers 
O.E.C.D. countries  929.6  1 876.5 
of which E.E.C. countries  457.2  598.7 
Non-Q.E.C.D. countries  3.2  245.0 
International Organizations  1 422.7  671.6 
(1)  This table is based on O.E.C.D. data and the definition of private placements is complementary to that 
of public issues compiled in Table 11. However, the definitions of the two may, in rare instances, overlap 
and some double-counting may occur. The table covers international markets throughout the world in 
addition to the European international market. 
earlier  in  this  chapter,  the primary market's 
problems had virtually been resolved by 1975. 
The amount raised by borrowers resident in the 
European Community remained fairly modest 
at almost 600 million unis of account in  1975 
according to these statistics. This was never-
theless a slightly higher proportion (21.4 per 
cent)  of total placings than was  recorded in 
1974 (19.4 per cent). 
3.2.1NTERNATIONAL MEDIUM-TERM 
CREDITS 
The market in internationally syndicated credits 
in 1975 again progressed in an opposite direc-
tion to that of the bond market and so, for two 
consecutive years,  these two sectors of the 
international  market  compensated  one  an-
other. In  part this was due to the relationship 
between  short and  long-term  interest  rates 
and  the  consequent  supply  of financial  re-
sources to each sector. On the other hand the 
1974  total  includes  a very large  amount of 
borrowing  by  national  governments,  either 
directly or through selected institutions in the 
public sector, to cover balance of payments 
deficits that were expected to result from the 
five-fold increase in the price of oil imposed by 
petroleum-exporting  countries.  By  1975 the 
problem  of the so-called  oil  deficits loomed 
less large because oil-exporting countries had 
begun to spend their additional revenues more 
rapidly than was thought likely. Some of these 
countries even returned to the euro-currency 
market as borrowers. 
According to statistics of publicised medium 
and long-term international bank loans which 
have  been  published  by the OECD  and are 
summarised in Table 14, the total of  such loans 
fell in  1975 by 6.2 milliard units of account to 
16.3 milliard or by 28 per cent. Within the total, 
loans granted to borrowers resident in  Com-
munity countries fell  by 8.6 milliard  units of 
account to 1.7 milliard, a drop of 83 per cent, 
less than half of which was explained by the 
comparative absence of government borrow-
ing in 1975 and the remainder by an apparent 
lack of demand on the part of enterprises. 
The decline in the EEC share was partly offset 
by  larger  borrowing  by petroleum-exporting 
countries,  by other high  income developing 
countries and by countries in Eastern Europe. 45 
Table 14-Publicised medium and long-term international bank loans (1) 
(million units of account) 
Currencies  1974  1975 
U.S.$  21  875.7  15 709.8 
Other  649.5  579.1 
Total  22 525.2  16 288.9 
Borrowers 
O.E.C.D. countries  14 746.7  4839.9 
of which:  E.E.C. countries  10292.4  1 703.1 
comprising: public authorities  4186.7  467.0 
enterprises  6105.7  1 236.1 
Non-O.E.C.D. countries  7 778.5  11  449.0 
of which:  developed countries  1 722.3  2 239.3 
developing countries  6056.2  9 209.7 
( 1)  This table is based on O.E.C.D. data and covers international markets throughout the world in addition 
to the European international market. 
As the market was shaken by a small number 
of banking failures during  1974 international 
banks became more circumspect in their lend-
ing. Some found that their own resources had 
shrunk in  relation  to their liabilities and  that 
they were nearing self-imposed limits on their 
loan portfolios. After these experiences, 1975 
was probably a period of consolidation for the 
market as a large scale provider of capital for 
industrialised  countries.  The  margins  over 
inter-bank interest rates which are charged to 
borrowers  and  which  form  the  basis  of the 
banks' earnings in floating interest rate loans 
tended to widen in the latter part of 197  4 and 
in 1975. A first class borrower in an industrialised 
country,  for  example,  would  have  been  re-
quired to pay about 0.5 per cent or perhaps 
slightly more during the first half of 197  4 where-
as in 1975 a similar borrower would have been 
charged around 1.25 per cent. 
The  margins charged on credits extended to 
developing countries were also widened but 
without  checking  the  rapid  growth  in  such 
credits. The demand for capital by developing 
countries is so vast and so urgent that relatively 
minor increases in the cost of borrowing have 
little restraining  effect. This  places more re-
sponsibility on the lender and, with the gift of 
hindsight, it seems that the lending banks could 
have been more judicious in their assessment 
of some borrowers during the course of the 
rapid expansion of credit to the Third World in 
1975. 
While the widening of margins helped to re-
store profitability which had been impaired by 
the inflation of costs and so  to improve the 
financial structure of banks participating in the 
market,  more  resources  became  available 
from American banks which turned to the inter-
national market to employ their funds because 
of the slackness of demand for credit in  the 
U.S.A. itself. The two or even three-tie:  system 
of inter-bank rates which had prevailed for part 
of 197  4 disappeared in the new circumstances 
and the circle of banks finding themselves able 
to participate in international syndicates con-
sequently widened. It thus became possible to 
spread  credit risks  over a larger number of 
banks. In addition when it  appeared in the latter 
part of 1975 that there was likely to be renewed 
growth of demand for international credits, the 
banks concerned took it upon themselves to 
examine the standing of potential borrowers 
more  critically  in  preference  to  widening 
margins further. 46 
CONCLUSION 
The conditions for investment and its financing 
were far from typical during 1975 in that the 
year spanned the trough of  the worst recession 
experienced  by  the  European  Community 
since its inception. Hopefully these conditions 
will not recur but nevertheless there are perhaps 
some  pointers for the future  which  can  be 
drawn even from an exceptional year. 
Superficially  1975  conformed  to  accepted 
ideas of a recession in which a decline in con-
sumption is  followed  by a general fall  in  the 
volume of fixed investment, the running down 
of stocks and a sharp rise in unemployment. 
This leads to the question why, if the recession 
conformed to a classic pattern, classic remedies 
in  so  far as  they were applied did  not work 
sooner. The answer seems partly to be that the 
recession was preceded by a period of  serious 
inflation and, for several countries, of balance 
of payments problems. Too vigorous an easing 
of monetary and fiscal policies would probably 
have revived these difficulties within a short 
time without necessarily checking the fall  in 
demand and the rise in unemployment. 
On the assumption that  approximately  the right 
mix of policies was adopted, the question still 
remains why the selective measures designed 
to stimulate investment did not have a quicker 
and  greater effect. The  existence of surplus 
capacity and uncertainty over economic pros-
pects were clearly important factors. Equally 
clearly lack of  finance from sources external to 
the business was not. It is true that on  many 
national bond markets, the public authorities 
borrowed more heavily than the private sector 
but this was the consequence of financing in a 
non-inflationary manner the programmes that 
were aimed at restimulating economic activity. 
The general decline in long-term interest rates 
during 1975 is prima facie evidence that bond 
markets were able to meet the demands for 
finance that was placed upon them. Presum-
ably the financial demands oft  he public author-
ities should abate as the tempo of  activity rises 
and economic recovery programmes, having 
achieved their aim, are cut back, leaving more 
scope for borrowing by enterprises. 
If  external  finance  was  not a  problem,  the 
answer to the sluggish response to investment 
incentives is perhaps to be found internally. The 
"normal"  financial  structure  of  companies 
varies from  country to  country and  from  in-
dustry to industry, but evidence suggests that 
there  has  been  a  secular,  widespread,  de-
terioration  in  company balance sheets. This 
seems to have been accentuated during 197  4 
and 1975 by inflation which partlytooktheform 
of a faster rise in  wage costs than in  output 
prices which continued after output began to 
fall. At the same time the replacement cost of 
capital installations continued to rise rapidly, 
rendering provisions for depreciation based on 
historic cost hopelessly inadequate. In short it 
seems possible that company profit margins 
over  a  wide  range  of activities  have  been 
squeezed so  far and  their capacity for self-
financing so  depleted that they have had to 
restrict their investment expenditure in order 
to  avoid  excessive  debt commitments  and 
consequently were slow to respond to official 
stimulus. Special schemes for strengthening 
the financial structure of  companies have been 
introduced or are planned, such as  the sub-
ordinated loans scheme in the Netherlands and 
similar  provisions  in  France  and  Denmark, 
whereby shortages of internal funds may be 
eased,  if temporarily.  It  remains  to  be  seen 
whether the weakness in company finances, 
which is partly cyclical, can be corrected with-
out external help as normal trading conditions 
are restored, or whether further special assis-
tance from national authorities will be required. PRINCIPAL SOURCES USED IN THIS REPORT 
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